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Executive Summary
This study examines the impact of the merger between Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) and the 
New York Stock Exchange Euronext (NYX) on the European financial markets. It takes the view 
that from a policy-making perspective the impact of the merger on the European financial 
markets should be assessed beyond the mere realm of economies of scale, market share and 
competition. The study therefore presents a broader framework, looking at (i) financial market 
stability and regulation, (ii) financial centre competitiveness, in particular of the euro area as a 
whole, and (iii) the inter-related goals of financial integration, cost-efficiency and harmonisa-
tion. The study comes to the following findings:
 ● Firstly, the study finds that the DBG-NYX merger is consistent with and contributes to 
regulatory efforts towards enhancing European and transatlantic financial market sta-
bility. The creation of an integrated, regulated trading and post-trading platform can 
provide an infrastructural response to the instability that has emerged from the finan-
cial markets in recent years, in particular in the OTC derivatives realm. In this context a 
strengthened transatlantic regulated exchange is desirable as it can extend the offer 
of central neutral risk management functions in addition to the more limited functions 
that are provided in an OTC context. These functions include liquidity and product stan-
dardisation, novation of contracts, active risk management, information provision and 
transparency, and the drawing on multiple ‘lines of defence’ (e.g. mandatory collateral, 
member guarantee funds, first-loss pools, capital calls on non-defaulting members, ac-
cess to central bank liquidity and the CCP’s own capital). As such, the merger contributes 
to current regulatory efforts towards more financial stability through the strengthen-
ing of a regulated exchange that provides a strong, liquid CCP with risk management 
capabilities within the euro area jurisdiction, thus taking up a key goal of European 
policy makers (in particular the ECB) after the crisis. With respect to the European and 
transatlantic regulation, this merged consolidated entity could provide the market side 
pre-requisites for regulators to build on in their cooperative efforts to reduce the risk of 
excessive regulatory arbitrage and avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ that could derive from an 
excessively competitive lowering of collateral thresholds and clearing fees and reduction 
of the layers of protection.
 ● Secondly, with respect to financial integration, cost efficiency and harmonisation, this 
study finds that the creation of a large pan-European and transatlantic player with en-
hanced depth in trading and scale in clearing and settlement, can be expected to fos-
ter the much-needed consolidation of the European trading market. It is also likely to 
generate additional benefits, particularly for cross-border trading, where costs are still 
higher than in the domestic arena. The consolidated merged entity also benefits from 
enhanced growth opportunities, creating a leading European derivatives player. This 
will position Europe on level playing field with increasing global competition by other 
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global exchanges such as BM&FBOVESPA, Korea Exchange and CME Group, which have 
already taken the lead in the equity, equity index and interest rate segments, and have 
achieved significant market shares. Analysis of comparable mergers also shows that such 
enhanced post-merger growth prospects do culminate in substantial high-value added 
employment increases, making the net effect much more positive than the short-term 
perspective would suggest. For example, CME Group, with its strongly growing deriva-
tives business has seen a 10% staff increase in the past year alone, more than offsetting 
the staff reductions in the previous year. A strong presence in growth segments such as 
derivatives clearly translates into revenue growth and attendant employment growth. 
 ● Thirdly, in terms of financial centre competitiveness, this study finds that European ex-
changes, and indirectly the financial centres they are embedded in, can be expected to 
benefit on the whole through an overall strengthened position in the global competi-
tive environment. The direct effect of the merger on the entity’s exchanges and their 
indirect but still relevant effect on national financial centre competitiveness should be 
assessed against the expected competitive positions of national centres in the absence 
of the merger. The positive effects of the merger can be expected to predominate: the 
merged entity is likely to create a global brand and enable global market access cen-
tred around a variety of European exchanges. A consolidated pan-European exchange 
entity can strengthen European financial centres as they have to position themselves 
in the strongly growing global derivatives market to offset likely losses in revenues in 
cash trading. Other global exchanges such as BM&FBOVESPA, Korea Exchange and CME 
Group have already rapidly progressed in the equity, equity index and interest rate seg-
ments, and have achieved significant market shares. Providing a strong European player 
in these markets will benefit the new entity’s various European exchanges, and indirectly 
the related financial centres in Europe, as they can advance their global positioning and 
brands in those asset classes and services, which are recording the fastest growth. 
Overall, the study mainly recommends that the process of developing a conclusive opinion on 
the DBG-NYX merger should be based on a careful evaluation of all three dimensions, in addi-
tion to the ongoing competition analysis (which is not the subject of this study). 
In light of this, the analysis presented here arrives at an overall positive assessment of the 
merger. In particular, it expects the merged entity to 
(i) facilitate regulatory action with a view to enhanced financial market stability; 
(ii)  to have a positive effect overall on the competitiveness of the European  exchange 
industry; 
(iii) to be a step in the direction of further financial integration in Europe. 
This contributes to the consolidation of the European trading market and thus further en-
hances the functioning of the single market and the single currency.
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4 1 Introduction
1 Introduction
The exchange industry in the last two decades, and especially in the past five years, has been 
changing significantly and dynamically. Only twelve years ago, when European Economic and 
Monetary Union was launched, stock trading was a largely domestic business mostly run by in-
cumbent national exchanges that until recently had operated on a mutualised non-profit basis. 
In 2011 the industry has evolved into an increasingly transnational, largely virtual business 
with intense competition between exchanges and new Multilateral Trading Facilities. The 
changed governance structure conditions the focus of this growth, as most exchanges today 
are primarily accountable to their shareholders. Today, almost all (96%) exchanges in the devel-
oped world are for-profit organizations, of which 40% are listed and thus themselves traded on 
markets.1 With average profit margins of 25.7% in 2009, the industry has been a real source of 
added value for shareholders and the financial centres the exchanges are embedded in.2
In the past years, there have been significant changes in the industry (see Section 2). The scale 
and intensity of this current wave of consolidations has led some observers to describe M&A 
activity in this industry as the ‘end game’ of Western regulated exchanges.3 Indeed, with 
emerging market players and alternative trading platforms combining to change the nature 
of global competition, the focus has returned to achieving global scale and scope in equity, 
bond and derivatives trading, as well as clearing and settlement, through M&A transactions. 
The commoditisation of many types of trades requires large exchanges and clearing houses to 
handle larger volumes and thus recover the significant infrastructure costs, whilst reducing 
transaction prices for end-users. In this context, the merger between Deutsche Börse Group 
(DBG) and NYSE Euronext (NYX) could be regarded as only one step towards the consolida-
tion – albeit the largest to date – of a still very fragmented European and transatlantic industry. 
But market consolidation is only one aspect of this merger. Policy discussions, public debates 
and media coverage have raised numerous questions about the costs and benefits for Euro-
pean financial centres and markets and particularly about the pros and cons from a regula-
tory point of view. Those elements of the discussion are addressed in this study. But in addi-
tion, the study also seeks focus on areas that have received relatively little attention thus far. 
Firstly, the study aims at bringing into the debate the impact of the merger on financial sta-
bility, a policy dimension that should be expected to rank highly on policy-makers’ agendas 
in the wake of the financial crisis. Also, rather little has been said about the overall role of cost 
efficiency, integration and harmonisation goals in relationship for instance to financial  stability. 
1	 World	Federation	of	Exchanges	(2010).	Cost	and	Revenue	Survey.	
2	 Ibid.
3	 PricewaterhouseCoopers	(2011).	Trading	blocs:	What	next	for	the	stock	exchanges?.	Report	released	August	
2011.
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This gap in the discussion creates the impression that the main policy trade-offs have re-
ceived rather little attention. 
Secondly, it is striking that the discussion of this merger has focused strongly on questions 
of national sovereignty, creating the impression of a ‘zero-sum game’ in the competitive-
ness of European financial centres. Naturally, such competitiveness concerns must rank highly 
with national policy-makers.4 In a global context, however, the struggle for competitiveness 
can hardly be regarded any longer as a zero-sum game involving European financial centres. 
Instead, Europe is competing with other regions for global relevance. It is therefore more rel-
evant to look at the merger from a pan-European perspective. Yet, as appears clear from para-
doxical statements of concern, there seems to be uncertainty about the impact of the merger5: 
representatives of the London financial centre have expressed concerns that the merger will 
support the rise of Frankfurt at the expense of London as a financial hub. At the same time, 
representatives of both Frankfurt and Paris have expressed similar concerns about the adverse 
impact that this merger might have on their own financial centres vis-à-vis New York, while 
in New York the outcry about the decline of the importance of New York as a global financial 
centre in terms of its European peers has been equally loud. Such statements indicate a certain 
degree of ambiguity about who will actually gain from the merger.
1.1 Scope of the Study
This study does not seek to present a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it aims to provide an analy-
sis of the impact of the merger in terms of the main choices, opportunities and trade-offs 
that regulators and policy-makers are facing in the context of the merger. There are three 
main policy dimensions that jointly define the core goals of policy-makers and regulators in 
the European financial markets and in securities trading. Those three dimensions are at the 
heart of the analysis presented here:
 ● Regulation and stability: Regulated exchanges and clearing houses, such as Deutsche 
Börse and NYSE Euronext, form the core of the European securities and settlement in-
frastructure and are thus crucial for the stability of the European markets. How does the 
merger fit into the regulatory landscape, given the post-financial crisis regulatory efforts 
to achieve a more stable financial market infrastructure? What can the merger contrib-
ute to efforts to address increasing intransparency and growing complexity (e.g. due to 
4	 Similar	debates	about	financial	centre	competitiveness	were	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	introduction	
of	the	euro.	For	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	impact	on	European	capital	markets	at	the	time,	see	Mat-
tern,	Frank,	Achleitner,	Ann-Kristin,	Streit,	Clara	C.,	Seifert,	Werner	G.	&	Voth,	Hans-Joachim	(2000).	European	
Capital	Markets.	Macmillan,	London.
5	 For	an	overview	of	the	initial	reactions	to	the	merger,	see	for	instance	an	article	by	James	Quinn	in	the	Tele-
graph	(2011).	Stock	exchange	mergers:	the	fight	for	global	dominance.	13	February	2011.	For	a	more	recent	
perspective	on	these	issues,	see	Jeremy	Grant	in	The	Financial	Times	(2011).	Quick	View:	What	next	for	DB-
NYSE	probe?	7	August	2011.
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dark pools and OTC markets)? What can a transatlantic entity do to avoid the regulatory 
race to the bottom of the past? How does the merger impact the stable conduct of mon-
etary policy in the euro area? 
 ● Integration, efficiency and harmonisation: Creating integrated, cost-efficient markets 
to support the single market in financial services has been a particular focus of various 
regulatory efforts by the Commission. The merger has raised concerns about increasing 
concentration in derivatives markets, but it also has the potential to yield economies of 
scale and scope. What cost efficiencies have already been achieved in trading and post-
trading? What are the remaining challenges, particularly with respect to cross-border 
trading, where the merger might have a direct impact? How does potential consolidation 
resulting from this merger affect the fragmentation of the European markets? To what 
extent can this merger be a step in the direction of harmonising transatlantic markets?
 ● Financial centre competitiveness: As discussed above, the ability of a financial centre to 
compete is indirectly linked to the presence of a large, competitive exchange providing 
access to global capital markets for financial institutions, governments, large-cap firms 
and small- and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). What is the trajectory of European fi-
nancial centres’ competitiveness in the face of global competition? How does the merger 
impact the varying comparative advantages of the European financial centres? 
A look at the development of the exchange industry over the past decade reveals that there 
can be trade-offs between these three policy goals. One can represent them as a ‘ triangle’ of 
competitiveness, integration and stability that can analytically be depicted as a regulatory 
‘trilemma’: three desirable policy objectives exist, but only two of them can be actually real-
ized at the expense of the other.6 Efforts to support competitive, integrated and cost-efficient 
markets do not necessarily result in enhanced financial stability. This was evident in the se-
curities trading and post-trading industry, both pre-crisis and post-crisis. Before the crisis, the 
successful efforts to integrate markets and open up competition culminated in substantial 
cost savings and more competitive exchanges at a global level. However, some aspects of the 
unregulated and more opaque competition undermined stability. The OTC derivatives market 
in particular contributed to instability and contagion, as risky exposures to defaulting firms 
spread quickly through an equally competitive but more opaque banking system. After the cri-
sis, a similar pattern can be seen in the introduction of the pro-competition Markets in Finan-
cial Infrastructure Directive (MiFID), which opened up competition in exchanges to a significant 
extent. The cost reduction efforts and competitiveness effects are clearly visible, but so are 
the unintended consequences of increased intransparency and fragmentation as well as the 
resulting risks to financial stability. 
6	 For	a	related	but	different	type	of	policy	trilemma	in	financial	supervision	see	Dirk	Schoenmaker	and	Sander	
Oosterloo	(2008).	A	New	Financial	Stability	Framework	for	Europe.	Financial	Regulator,	Vol	13(3),	December	
2008.	The	trilemma	concept	expressed	reflects	ideas	developed	in	the	context	of	an	ongoing	PhD	disserta-
tion	project	by	Gundbert	Scherf	supervised	by	the	author	of	this	study.
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1.2 Structure of the Study
The analysis of the impact of the merger along this triangle or trilemma is structured as fol-
lows: Section 2 sets the stage and takes a look at the trends and discontinuities affecting this 
fast-changing industry; Sections 3-5 then deal with each of the policy dimensions, namely reg-
ulation and financial stability (Section 3), financial integration, cost efficiency and harmonisa-
tion (Section 4), and financial centre competitiveness (Section 5). Each of these three sections 
first establishes the baseline and then assesses the expected impact of the DBG-NYX merger. 
A brief conclusion (page 50) summarizes the implications for policymakers.
The trilemma in trading and post-trading regulation and policy-making
Financial Stability
Competitiveness of 
National Financial 
Centres
Integration, Cost 
Efficiency and 
Harmonisation
SOURCE: Author based on concepts currently developed in supervised PhD work by Gundbert Scherf
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2  Trends and Discontinuities in the 
Exchange Industry in Europe
More than three years after the beginning of the financial market crisis, the exchange industry 
has picked up momentum and is continuing along its trajectory towards fully-fledged consoli-
dation. As a look at the largest global mergers in the exchange industry shows, this sector is 
a highly dynamic one. Consolidation had been ongoing prior to 2008 and only slowed down 
during the crisis, with only one deal of any significant size in the crisis year of 2008 and none in 
2009 (see Figure 2).
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The key driver behind the successful growth and transformation of exchanges and clearing pro-
viders has been the marketisation of the European financial systems, where stock market capi-
talisation has grown steadily across all economies in the years from 2002 to 2002, returning to 
– and in some cases exceeding – the levels achieved before the dot-com bubble burst in the early 
2000s. The financial crisis naturally put a dent in this long-term growth pattern but since then 
capitalisation levels of exchanges have been recovering (see Figure 3 below).
Largest stock exchange mergers globally
CBOT
Bovespa
Euronext
ASX
NYMEX
OMX
OMX
TMX
ISE
NYSE
Total transaction value and transaction partners
In USD million
SOURCE: Author based on Thomson Reuters; Die Welt
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To serve these increasing market trading volumes, exchanges have not only enhanced their 
infrastructure to align the provision of liquidity, maturity transformation and information with 
changing circumstances, but have also developed their capabilities in risk management and 
extended their service offerings along the value chain into innovative pre-trade (e.g. data pro-
vision) and post-trade (e.g. clearing, settlement and custody) services. However, sharp discon-
tinuities such as significant technological evolution, deregulation and increasing demand for 
cross-border services have made competition much more intense. As a result, the winners in 
this changing industry have been those trading platforms and exchange groups that have 
embraced these changes, evolving to meet the demand for increasingly pan-European and 
even global offerings through innovative products and technologies, but also through strategic 
moves such as mergers and partnerships. 
The planned merger between DBG and NYX must thus be seen in the context of structural 
changes (2.1). These changes have created a need for European consolidation and global part-
nerships (2.2). However, despite the clearly positive effects on the industry, cost efficiency has 
had an ambiguous affect on its performance (2.3), as large parts of the trading market still are 
fragmented, under-regulated and intransparent. It is in the context of these ensuing challenges 
in a changing industry that the DBG-NYX merger has emerged as a strategic option for both 
entities. 
Stock market capitalisation of exchanges over time (indexed)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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2.1 Structural Forces of Change
The trading and exchange market has been subject to three major forces of change of political, 
economic and technological origin. These forces of change have unfolded their significant im-
pact in parallel and have combined to transform market structures and conduct in Europe: 
i) Internationalisation: With global cross-border capital flows growing by 10% per an-
num in the 1990s and 19% per annum from 1998 to 2006, before dropping in the course 
the crisis and then rebounding,7 the trading business has become more internation-
alised and increasingly cross-border. In equity markets, more than a quarter of trading 
turnover takes place on pan-European Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs).8 With less 
IPOs in total relative to ten years ago, large financial centres and their home exchanges 
are competing to list also new international IPOs. This is now no longer an American phe-
nomenon, with the NYSE already taking a large share of foreign IPOs in 2000. Both the 
Singapore exchange and Deutsche Börse have seen their share of foreign IPOs increase 
from small levels in 2000 to approximately 50% and 70% respectively in 2010. Despite 
many challenges remaining on the supply side of cross-border trading, such as the frag-
mentation of the European market, the demand for trading and post-trade services is 
increasingly also international.
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7	 McKinsey	Global	Institute	(2009).	Mapping	Global	Capital	Markets	–	4th	Annual	Report.	
8	 Diego	Valiante	(2011).	NYSE	Euronext	–	Deutsche	Börse	Merger:	Let	the	dance	go	on!	ECMI	Policy	Brief	No.	
18/	March	2011.
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ii) Technological change: When physical trading on the Deutsche Börse floor was discon-
tinued in July 2011, this was only a symbolic step at the end of a continuous trend. Au-
tomated trading on electronic exchanges has made trading a largely virtual business in 
which market participants rely on exchanges to provide fast, reliable communication and 
computing technologies to facilitate new trading strategies. Traders are now demanding 
higher execution speeds to successfully deploy the algorithmic and high-frequency trad-
ing strategies that are enabled by technological innovation. While investment in these 
innovative technologies remains costly, higher trading volumes on the platforms with 
reduced order sizes allow large platforms to achieve economies of scale. As a result, trad-
ing costs are declining and quoting traffic and liquidity are on the rise, as Angel, Harris, 
and Spatt show in depth for the US market.9 
iii) Liberalisation: Since the launch of EMU, the European regulatory authorities, spear-
headed by the European Commission, have successfully advanced competition and cost 
efficiency in the trading and post-trading industry through liberalisation. The introduc-
tion of MiFID in 2007 ended the ‘concentration rule’ under which regulators in some 
countries could request the execution of trades on regulated exchanges. This change 
has opened up competition to new entrants such as Electronic Communications Net-
works (ECNs) and Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). Most incumbent exchange mar-
ket shares have dropped between 10 and 20 percentage points from 2008 to 2011 alone. 
Deutsche Börse, as well as all Euronext exchanges, have suffered a loss in trading volume 
market share in the magnitude of 8 to 22 percentage points in those three years (see 
Figure below). This volume has largely gone to new MTFs as well as unregulated and in-
transparent trading venues, as shown below. 
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9	 Angel,	James	J.,	Harris,	Lawrence	E.,	and	Spatt,	Chester	S.	(2010).	Equity	Trading	in	the	21st	Century.	
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As a result of these changes, the European trading, clearing and settlement market has under-
gone structural change. Competition has become much fiercer as trading costs have dropped 
across asset classes, effectively commoditising equity trading. Trading in traditional asset 
classes such as equities and bonds has declined in terms of revenue contribution, which has led 
successful exchanges to diversify into the regulated trading of derivatives – a strong growth 
market. New players have entered the competitive scene, with a total of 49 players in the ‘lit 
market’ (regulated markets and MTFs), plus 32 in the ‘dark markets’.10 MTFs that entered the 
market only in the last five years, such as Chi-X, BATS and Turquoise, have already entered the 
top 10 in terms of trading volumes.
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2.2 Evolving Business Models and Corporate Strategies
As new alternative and specialized exchanges and MTFs have entered the market, the market 
has become more fragmented. Given the increasing globalisation of the trading and clearing 
industry, observers, regulators and market participants alike noted that there was a risk of the 
European market becoming too fragmented.11 This has posed the challenge for exchanges to 
integrate and consolidate, so as to capture sufficient volumes to enable them to meet trader 
demands for lower transaction costs and higher liquidity. As a con sequence, exchanges and 
clearing systems have adapted their business models and corporate strategies to survive in a 
more competitive environment.
10	 Gomber	and	Pierron	(2010).	MiFiD	–	Spirit	and	Reality	of	a	European	Financial	Markets	Directive.
11	 Jens	Tapking,	ECB,	and	Jing	Yang,	BoE,	(2004).	Horizontal	and	vertical	integration	in	securities	trading	and	
settlement.	Working	Paper	No.	245
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In terms of business models, the exchange and clearing market has seen the persistence as 
well as adoption of vertical integration strategies by exchanges. Exchanges have reacted to 
market demands for the provision of clearing and settlement services on the same platform. 
Pagano and Padilla find that the benefits of the integrated model arise mainly from efficien-
cies in clearing and settlement through economies of scale and scope and network effects.12 
A key efficiency factor relates to the elimination of double marginalization that separate clear-
ing could involve. Because of these efficiency benefits, DBG as well as most leading derivatives 
exchanges offer integrated clearing houses on the same platform, including market players 
such CME Group, ICE, NASDAQ OMX and the Hong Kong Exchange, as well as the Australian 
Securities Exchange and the Sydney Futures Exchange. Other players such as the London Stock 
Exchange have also moved towards the integrated model – in the case of the LSE through its 
acquisition of the Italian exchange. This will enable it to offer integrated central counterparty 
and central depository services, from which its newly launched ‘Turquoise Derivatives’ deriva-
tives platform can also benefit.
Two strategies have been particularly prevalent in recent years in moves to achieve scale and 
scope:
 ● Consolidation/M&A: As shown clearly in Figure 8, there have been significant consoli-
dation efforts through various attempted and successful mergers in the American and 
European exchange markets. What used to be 20 reasonably large exchanges are now 
turning into a handful of consolidated exchange groups that are looking to advance 
scale and scope to meet globalised demand.13
 ● Partnerships: Where mergers have not been deemed feasible or possible, exchanges 
have entered into partnerships to enhance their scale and scope through cooperation, 
for instance in product development or sales. Like mergers, these partnerships are in-
creasingly global in nature, reflecting the globalisation of the industry. Most recently, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME) and the Osaka Securities Exchange publicly 
announced a deal in which they would ‘jointly develop and market futures contracts in 
a move that will further expand the CME Group’s global franchise at a time of increas-
ing competition and consolidation in the global exchange sector.’14 As another example, 
following the DBG-NYX merger announcement, Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd 
12	 Marco	Pagano	and	Jorge	Padilla	(2005).	The	Economics	of	Cash	Trading:	An	Overview.
13	 As	Valiante	finds	in	a	recent	policy	brief	on	European	exchange	markets:	‘Organised	trading	platforms	are	
day-by-day	extending	their	boundaries	to	a	more	global	scale	and	into	more	complex	asset	classes,	for	
which	the	provision	of	execution	and	related	services	is	already	an	important	source	of	revenues.	Exchanges	
need	now	to	redesign	their	business	models	in	order	to	keep	pace	with	changes	in	market	structure.	To	grow	
and	gain	business	at	global	level,	exchanges	are	currently	consolidating	businesses	to	acquire	relevant	know-
how	and	economies	of	scale	(…).’	See	Diego	Valiante	(2011).	NYSE	Euronext	–	Deutsche	Börse	Merger:	Let	the	
dance	go	on!	ECMI	Policy	Brief	No.	18/	March	2011.	p.1.
14	 Financial	News	(2011).	CME	Group	and	Osaka	to	build	new	futures	contracts.	Article	dated	26	July	2011,	ac-
cessed	online	27	July	2011.
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declared its willingness to discuss partnerships that would complement its China focus 
in order to stay competitive.15
The planned merger is thus occurring in a highly competitive phase of consolidation and trans-
formation in the European and global exchange market. Continued merger activity has seen 
(unsuccessful) merger talks in the last year between Tokyo and Osaka Exchange, the London 
and Toronto Stock Exchange, and the Singapore Exchange and Australia Exchange. Moreover, 
the leading Asian exchanges of Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing, Shanghai and Shenzhen un-
veiled joint venture partnership talks in August 2011, stating that they are looking into the 
joint development of index and other equity derivative products, as well as the creation of 
new indices.16 From this perspective, it is understandable that DBG and NYX see their merger 
as a crucial element in their longer-term strategy to acquire a global presence from the posi-
tion of strength that the merging entities still enjoy by virtue of their strong long-term growth 
and profitability. However, a look at the global derivatives market shows that competition will 
continue to be fierce. Just recently, in May 2011, Chi-X’s new derivatives platform was joined 
by LSE’s Turquoise Derivatives, a new pan-European platform for futures and options that – in 
combination with the acquired Canadian EDX derivatives platform – is set to become a com-
petitive force in the European market.17 Additionally, large players such as the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE) and CME Group have already launched projects (ICE) or indicated their inten-
tions (CME) to enter the clearing market with European clearing houses.
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15	 MSNBC	(2011).	Exchanges	seek	partners	after	Deutsche	Boerse’s	NYSE	bid.	Article	dated	10	February	2011,	
accessed	online	3	July	2011.	
16	 Reuters	(2011).	3-HKEx	says	in	JV	talks	with	Shanghai,	Shenzhen	exchanges.	18	August	2011.
17	 Ibid.
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2.3 Effects on Industry Performance
In a nutshell, the integration and consolidation of trading markets in Europe is well under way 
but as yet incomplete. The efforts at integration have clearly realised some benefits (these will 
be discussed in Chapter 4). However, this process is still ongoing and some of the unintended 
side effects resulting from efforts focused strongly on increased competition entail certain 
risks to systemic stability (Chapter 3). This is not surprising in light of a review of some of the 
early literature on the nature of competition in the trading industry. Research going back as far 
as Hamilton (1979)18 has established that there are two countervailing forces at work that cre-
ate a tension between competition on the one hand and stability and integration on the other: 
while increased competition attracts more exchanges and clearing houses to enhance compe-
tition (competition effect), it also reduces the centralisation of the industry and prevents econ-
omies of scale from being realised (fragmentation effect). When looking at the reality of the 
European trading and post-trading market, it becomes clear that the competition effect has 
been dominant in recent years. The positive effects of this intensified pan-European competi-
tion have led to declining trading costs, by most accounts and for most products, as studies by 
Oxera for the EU Commission (2009 & 2011) have found.19 At the same time, largely in line with 
theoretical predictions, the industry structure remains fragmented whilst intransparency has 
increased (see below) and certain risks to instability, particularly the large unregulated OTC 
trading volumes, have not been mitigated (see previous section).
In this context, the introduction of MiFID – with its focus on increasing competition and ef-
ficiency – has had unintended adverse effects on market transparency. Increasing volumes 
of trades are being channelled through more intransparent OTC markets using broker/dealer 
crossing networks (BDCNs) and dark pools.20 Gomber and Pierron (2010), the authors of this 
extensive study on the impact of MiFID, also find that price transparency has diminished as in-
vestors attempt to capture as much information as possible about their peers’ trading patterns 
and strategy, while at the same time minimising their own information leakage. Gresse (2010) 
also looks at the post-MiFID period and finds that the enforcement of pro-competition regula-
tion has increased fragmentation, leading to a deterioration in execution and price quality.21 
Cross-border trading costs are still higher than domestic trading costs due to fragmentation 
and the incomplete integration and consolidation of the European trading and post-trading 
markets. The same is true for clearing and settlement services.22 
18	 James	Hamilton	(1979).	Marketplace	Fragmentation,	Competition,	and	the	Efficiency	of	the	Stock	Exchange.	
Journal	of	Finance,	34(1),	171-187.
19	 Oxera	for	the	EU	Commission	(2011).	Monitoring	prices,	costs,	and	volumes	of	trading	and	post-trading	ser-
vices.
20	 Gomber	and	Pierron	(2010).	MiFiD	–	Spirit	and	Reality	of	a	European	Financial	Markets	Directive.
21	 Gresse	(2010).	Multi-Market	Trading	and	Market	Quality.	
22	 Ibid.
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To conclude this short review and contextualisation: After years of liberalisation and industry 
transformation, there is now a need for consolidation in order to restore the role of stability 
vis-à-vis competitiveness, which are equally important public policy objectives. The past years 
have been dominated by the overriding concern for enhanced cost efficiency and competition, 
thereby lowering the scope for policies geared towards stability concerns. In this context, the 
merger not only appears to be a plausible next step within the industry, but also to be a desir-
able opportunity, from a general macroeconomic perspective: It  creates a more liquid trading 
platform and clearing house that operates transparently and that will contribute to the much 
needed integration and stabilisation of the European financial markets. 
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3 Regulation and Financial Stability
3.1  Baseline: Global unfettered Market Segments and  
Their Discontents
Global capital flows demand harmonised global regulatory regimes for trading and post-trad-
ing to ensure financial stability. However, regulators of the securities and securities infrastruc-
tures industry have been struggling since the onset of the internationalisation of markets 
in the 1980s to create a transatlantic consensus on the necessary regulatory standards for 
financial stability. MIT political economist David Singer, in a comparative analysis of the prog-
ress on banking regulation and the lack thereof in securities regulation, concludes that in se-
curities ‘the specter of financial stability was not a great enough incentive for regulators to 
converge on an international standard. Instead, regulators were driven by domestic political 
circumstances’, which he finds were largely based on considerations centred around the com-
petitiveness of the domestic industry.23 Consequently, the industry called for efforts to achieve 
joint transatlantic regulation prior to the financial crisis, but these have not culminated in any 
integrated transatlantic regulatory regime, which is why Deutsche Bank Research fittingly calls 
it a ‘work in progress’.24
With risks to financial stability largely opaque and financial markets thriving, there was an at 
least implicit assumption that competition and competitiveness would also bring about stabil-
ity as a natural side effect. As such, much of the regulatory efforts in Europe pre-2008 were 
oriented on achieving a single market (particularly in cash trading), and thus focused more on 
integration, efficiency and harmonisation (see Chapter 4 on these policy goals) rather than 
financial stability. Moreover, in most areas, where consensus on financial stability goals was 
achieved either regionally or internationally, the principle-based regulatory logic has been to 
maintain national flexibility in implementation and not to punish market innovation. Theoreti-
cally, this would have allowed for more stringent implementation of agreed standards and su-
pervision of compliance with those standards. In reality, this principle-based regulation often 
opened the window for varying degrees of stringency of implementation and supervision. As 
too much reliance had been placed on national supervisors, a regulatory race to the bottom, 
also referred to as ‘systems competition’, 25 that was driven by regulatory arbitrage ensued in 
many areas of financial market regulation.26 
23	 David	Singer	(2007).	Regulating	Capital:	Setting	Standards	for	the	International	Financial	System.	Cornell	
University	Press.
24	 Steffen	Kern,	Deutsche	Bank	Research	(2008).	EU-US	financial	market	integration	–	a	work	in	progress.	EU	
Monitor	96.	Financial	Market	Special.
25	 Hans-Werner	Sinn	(2004).	The	new	systems	competition.	Perspektiven	der	Wirtschaftspolitik,	5(1),	23-38.
26	 For	the	practicioner’s	perspective	on	this	phenomenon	see:	New	York	Times	(2011).	Geithner	Warns	Against	
Race	to	the	Bottom.	June	6th,	2011.
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The financial market crisis has returned the reduction of systemic risk and the creation of fi-
nancial stability to the top of the regulatory agenda and, as such, obviated the need for more 
global, more stringent and more rule-based regulation. Particular attention has since been 
paid to those areas of the financial markets that were identified as key drivers of instability in 
the financial crisis. As such, the huge unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets 
have become the centre of attention in current regulatory efforts, leading the G20 to assert 
in the 2009 Pittsburgh Declaration that: ‘All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be 
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported 
to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital 
requirements.’27 The 2010 Toronto Declaration added that measures should be taken to ‘im-
prove transparency and regulatory oversight of [OTC] derivatives in an internationally consis-
tent and non-discriminatory way.’28 The primary systemic risk arose from the fact that, due to 
the lack of a central counterparty (CCP) in these contracts, OTC derivatives exposed the coun-
terparties to potential serial knock-on failures from one counterparty to another if one party to 
a contract defaulted.29 Given the fact that 90% of the strongly growing approximately EUR 500 
trillion global derivatives market is traded over the counter, this opacity and complexity still 
represents a major threat to financial stability, both in Europe and globally. Volumes traded on 
regulated exchanges globally are still relatively marginal in relation to the predominant OTC 
market (see Figure 8).
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27	 G20	(2009).	Leaders’	Statement	at	The	Pittsburgh	Summit.	24-25	September	2009.
28	 G20	(2010).	G20	Toronto	Summit	Declaration.	26-27	June	2010.
29	 IMF	(2010).	Global	Financial	Stability	Report:	Meeting	New	Challenges	to	Stability	and	Building	a	Safer	Sys-
tem.
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This regulatory challenge of opacity and complexity is certainly most prominent in the deriva-
tives market due to its sheer scale and growth. Estimates of the volume of OTC trading (vs. on-
book trading on regulated exchanges) suggest that in both equity and bond markets, ~45% and 
~90% respectively of trading by volume outstanding takes place over the counter, which reveals 
that transparency issues are not limited to global derivatives markets. Nevertheless, counter-
parties here will often include sovereigns and companies with a more transparent standing 
and with more sources of (implicit) collateral, thus, reducing systemic risks.
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Nor does an analysis of the trends in trading markets suggest that this is going to reverse soon. 
On the contrary, the unintended consequences of a long-standing regulatory focus on increas-
ing competition and cost efficiency are visible in terms of systemic risk, fragmentation and 
intransparency, as the shown by the rather alarming findings of a study on the consequences 
of MiFID on European markets30. The authors find that
 ● Increasing volumes of trade are channelled through more intransparent OTC markets, us-
ing channels such as broker/dealer crossing networks (BDCNs) and dark pools.
 ● Market shares of OTC venues in trading turnover reached levels of approximately 40% 
throughout 2008 and 2009.
 ● This OTC trading has also extended to smaller order volumes, since – despite the inten-
tions of MiFiD to limit OTC to ‘dealings above standard market size’ – 54% of OTC trades 
were below standard market sizes in 2010.
30	 Peter	Gomber	and	Axel	Pierron	(2010).	MiFiD	–	Spirit	and	Reality	of	a	European	Financial	Markets		Directive.
Securities market overview: Trading on-exchange and OTC
Equity1
SOURCE: Author based on BIS; Thomson Reuters; FESE; World Federation of Exchanges; ISDA
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 ● Price transparency has gone down, as investors are trying to capture as much informa-
tion about their peers’ trading patterns and strategy while minimising their own infor-
mation leakage;
The regulatory efforts in Europe enshrined in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR), and in Dodd-Frank in the United States, can be seen as the regulatory response to re-
store financial stability. And the fact that the EMIR initiative will culminate in a regulation that 
must be implemented directly by the member states, rather than a directive, is evidence of a 
shift towards a rules-based approach to financial market regulation. The objective of EMIR is to 
improve transparency and enhance market safety and regulatory oversight after the financial 
crisis, particularly in OTC markets. The central elements of EMIR will be a direct requirement for 
mandatory clearing and reporting of derivatives trades, prudential and business requirements 
for central counterparties (CCPs), and, possibly the creation of more interoperability for CCP 
(equities) operations. These CCPs, such as DBG’s Eurex Clearing, facilitate stability by providing 
safeguards, multilateral netting and risk management services, thus reducing total exposures 
and systemic risk substantially, while also economising on margin requirements. However, the 
diminished prominence attached to stability concerns and the competing domestic consider-
ations regarding the differential impact that any transatlantic stability regime might have on 
the competitiveness of the domestic industry are likely to make this a complex task.
3.2  Impact of the Merger: Strengthening the Infrastructure for 
Regulated, Transparent and Stable Markets
Against this backdrop, the DBG-NYX merger is consistent with and contributes to regulatory 
efforts towards enhancing European and transatlantic financial stability. Current regulatory 
efforts have stressed the need to make the financial infrastructure more resilient to the failure 
of single financial institutions, which in the recent crisis have triggered systemic events.31 The 
creation of a consolidated regulated European trading and post-trading platform can provide 
the infrastructural response to the instability that has emerged from the OTC derivatives mar-
ket, which still represents approximately 90% of derivatives trading and has been identified as 
a key driver behind the financial instability in 2007-2009. How exactly larger OTC volumes will 
be channelled towards regulated markets, MTFs, and OTFs is still to be determined by regu-
lators. However, the creation of counterparties with strong risk management capabilities for 
derivatives trading will be prerequisite. The ECB and policy-makers have in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis attempted to increase financial stability by bolstering the post-trading in-
31	 The	IMF	lists	three	types	of	initiatives	that	have	been	taken	to	contain	systemic	risk:	i)	preventive	measures	
such	as	liquidity	and	capital	buffers;	ii)	containment	measures	such	as	resolution	frameworks;	iii)	improve-
ments	to	the	financial	infrastructure.	See	IMF	(2010).	Global	Financial	Stability	Report:	Meeting	new	Chal-
lenges	to	Stability	and	Building	a	Safer	System.	Chapter	3.
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frastructure – with a particular focus on the OTC derivatives market.32 Thus, from an economic 
perspective, 
i)  by advancing the key ECB goal of having a CCP within the euro area jurisdiction the 
merger contributes to key policy efforts of the regulators towards financial stability. 
Moreover, from a political economy perspective, 
ii)  the merged entity establishes a market-side prerequisite for further regulatory har-
monisation in the European financial markets; and 
iii)  can give further impetus to aligning regulatory interests of competitiveness and sta-
bility across the Atlantic. 
In other words, since a merged entity has no interest in differing levels of regulation in both 
the United States and Europe, as it does not benefit as a whole from this ‘regulatory arbitrage’, 
which traders engage in, it can be built on by regulators in their cooperative efforts to harmo-
nise and integrate regulation. The following sections will look at each of these stability topics 
in turn.
First, the merged company’s regulated exchange platforms will extend Eurex’ current pro-
vision of a pan-European integrated infrastructure for transparent trading offering central 
counterparty services for larger volumes of trade. This implies that the deal then also extends 
liquidity and novation benefits of contracts that Eurex provides already today. The financial cri-
sis has revealed that those increasingly non-regulated derivatives market segments that were 
lacking central counterparties (CCPs) failed to provide the required levels of transparency, risk 
management and, consequently, financial stability.33 There is counterparty credit risk behind 
every bilateral OTC transaction, meaning the risk that one of the parties to the transaction will 
become insolvent and fail. Given the accumulation of huge volumes of OTC derivatives posi-
tions, the default of single counterparties could lead to a domino or knock-on effect that could 
trigger a financial crisis and then a recession, as it did in 2008. The resulting web of intercon-
nections and bilateral exposures, coupled with inadequate risk management and collaterali-
sation, results in a high level of complexity, uncertainty and instability, in turn triggering the 
contagion of defaults that characterised the financial crisis at large.34 
32	 ECB	(2009).	OTC	derivatives	and	post-trading	infrastructures.	Report,	September	2009.	
The	ECB	restates	here	the	Governing	Council’s	decision	of	16	July	2009	that	‘the	Eurosystem	is	particularly	
interested	in	the	availability	and	use	of	adequate	post-trading	infrastructures	for	the	processing	of	euro-
denominated	OTC	derivatives	within	the	euro	area.’	(p.	27)
33	 Ibid.	For	a	good	overview	on	the	causes	of	the	crisis,	see	Baily,	M.	N.,	Litan,	R.	E.,	&	Johnson,	M.	S.	(2008).	The	
Origins	of	the	Financial	Crisis.	Business	and	Policy	at	Brookings.	Also	for	an	overview	of	the	key	distinction	
between	exchange-traded	and	OTC	derivatives	see:	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	Commission	(2010).	Preliminary	
Staff	Report:	Overview	on	Derivatives.		
34	 For	the	role	of	complexity	as	a	key	driver	of	financial	instability	and	the	crisis	see	Brunnermeier,	M.	&	Oehm-
ke,	M.	(2009).	Complexity	in	Financial	Markets.	
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It is in the area of counterparty risk management that regulated multilateral trading platforms 
and clearing houses on the one hand and bilateral OTC markets on the other differ in terms 
of mitigating these risks, as well as minimising the potential impact of their crystallisation. As 
such, bilateral contracts traded over the counter create decentralised networks with mutual 
financial obligations. Certain commercial vendors provide risk management and clearing ser-
vices for the transaction, including determining the payment amounts, daily valuations, coun-
terparty credit quality monitoring and record keeping. Additionally, OTC derivatives contracts 
can equally be subject to: 
 ● Netting: The process of offsetting the different exposures owed by the parties.
 ● Multilateral compression and tear-ups: The elimination of redundant contracts.
 ● Collateralisation: The posting of liquid securities as collateral; 
The netting effect is indeed substantial and has been growing in line with the markets, allow-
ing for more offsetting due to improved liquidity. Today, netting effects by a factor of five are 
possible in OTC derivatives markets (see Figure 21 below). However, there are also differences 
in the OTC clearing services that distinguish them from exchange-based clearing. The key re-
maining difference is that, in providing these services, vendors do not take on counterparty risk 
and thus have different incentives. Moreover, prices and exposures are still intransparent, as 
OTC dealers often transmit bid and ask quotes as well as execution prices only to the parties, 
including by phone or on electronic order matching platforms. Lastly, OTC dealers manage col-
lateralisation very heterogeneously across various transactions. The 2010 ISDA margin survey 
of OTC derivatives dealers shows that 30% of OTC derivatives transactions are not collater-
alised at all – collateralisation practices for the other 70% are very divergent, to the extent that 
the IMF finds that ‘how much collateral is currently posted against OTC derivative positions is 
not known with certainty.’35 
35	 Ibid,	p.	5
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Regulated multilateral market infrastructure providers, meaning integrated exchanges such 
as Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext, provide these key central counterparty services and 
Global OTC derivative exposures and effect of netting
SOURCE: Author based on BIS and ISDA data (2010)
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can offer the central neutral risk management functions. In addition to the functions they can 
provide in an OTC context (see above), additional CCP benefits comprise:36 
 ● Liquidity and product standardisation: Providing the crucial scale and depth to the mar-
ket for enhanced liquidity and advancing standardization – a condition for exchange-
traded derivatives trading; 
 ● Novation of contracts: Taking on the actual counterparty risk by acting as counterparty 
to the transaction partners and netting out positions multilaterally through the sum of 
positions;
 ● Additional risk management: Mitigating various risks, from credit risk to operational risk, 
through continuous monitoring from trade date to delivery of the underlying;
 ● Information provision and transparency: Providing a central information repository that 
is also accessible to regulators so as to increase transparency for transactions;
 ● Drawing on multiple ‘lines of defence’/‘waterfall’ mechanism: In the event of default, 
mobilising multiple ‘lines of defence’ such as mandatory collateral, member guarantee 
funds, first-loss pools, the other counterparty’s contributions, capital calls on non-de-
faulting members, access to central bank liquidity and, lastly, the CCP’s own capital; 37
Thus, more extensive derivatives trading with central counterparties as occurs on regulated 
exchanges is desirable from a stability point of view. This is reflected in the current shape that 
EMIR and Dodd-Frank have taken, indicating that they will both regulate in favour of more 
trading of OTC derivatives on regulated exchanges. Clearly, some of these scale and liquidity 
benefits could also be reaped by linking CCPs and making them interoperable. However, the 
additional operational risks associated with this in addition to the required standards and risk 
management practices make this both a ‘second-best’ as well as a long-shot solution to central 
stability challenges.
The policy questions that regulators must now address are whether the market infrastructure 
for this is in place and, if so, where this infrastructure will be located. European authorities such 
as the ECB have expressed a particular interest in locating the central counterparty in Europe, 
as the conduct of monetary policy is largely affected by the stability of a CCP clearing euro-
denominated derivatives. The merger would in all likelihood create such a larger and, hence, 
more liquid regulated exchange for derivatives trading in Europe. There are strong reasons to 
36	 These	additional	benefits	are	captured	as	follows	by	the	ECB	and	CESR	in	their	guidelines	on	securities	
settlement	regulation:	‘In	view	of	the	greater	complexity	of	OTC	derivatives	and	the	relative	illiquidity	of	
certain	contracts,	the	Group	considered	that	risk	management	could	differ	and,	therefore,	it	was	essential	
for	CCPs	to	be	as	transparent	as	possible	for	both	regulators	and	users	and	to	ensure	effective	risk	manage-
ment	while	users	are	encouraged	to	deliver	price	data	to	CCPs	for	risk	management	purposes.’	See	ECB/	CESR	
(2009).	Recommendations	for	Securities	Settlement	Systems	and	Recommendations	for	Central	Counterpar-
ties	in	the	European	Union.	p.	9
37	 Ibid.
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believe that this new exchange would execute all of the above mentioned stability functions 
more effectively and more efficiently. With increased scale, the liquidity and novation effects of 
contracts are likely to become more powerful, reducing net exposures in the system and thus 
systemic risk. Additionally, central counterparties such as DBG-NYX could capture trade infor-
mation instantly by integrating trading and clearing on a single platform, thus leveraging this 
for their risk management and information provision functions. Lastly, European regulated ex-
changes acting as CCPs may be given access to the European Central Bank’s accounts to draw 
on additional temporary liquidity. The ECB believes that the likelihood of this happening in the 
context of CCPs for credit default swaps is increasing, stating that ‘EU public authorities, as well 
as a growing share of the European user community, consider [this] a basic requirement for the 
safe functioning of a CCP for CDS.’38 It has been announced that derivatives trading and clearing 
in the new group entity will be located in Frankfurt and thus within the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the German financial supervisory authority 
(BaFin) – complemented by the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). It is in this context that 
the merger provides the opportunity for the creation of a pan-European and transatlantic central 
counterparty with strong risk management capabilities that can enhance the functioning of the 
European markets and provide stability for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. 
Second, the merged entity can be expected to have a positive effect for regulatory efforts 
by reinforcing market-side interest in the continued efforts to harmonise European (post-)-
trading regulation – an issue that is becoming more relevant with increasing cross-border trad-
ing. Currently, central counterparties within Europe are regulated nationally by securities regu-
lators. Both the European System of Central Banks and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators have provided guidelines for the further harmonisation of this regulatory area, but 
their implementation is still a matter for the national authorities.39 Clearly, the merged entity 
– with its multiple presences across European financial centres – will also allow national regu-
latory and supervisory authorities to maintain control over the relevant European exchanges, 
as the NYSE-Euronext merger case has shown. Harmonisation is, however, a precondition in 
any globalising or Europeanising market segment; its absence results in regulatory arbitrage 
and fragmentation, which are clear threats to financial stability. A primary integrated trading 
platform oriented on standardisation and harmonisation can be built on by joint regulatory ef-
forts at the European and national level. Such market-side interest in (or at least neutrality to-
wards) harmonisation is helpful in a policy area that is very technical and complex and requires 
market-side participation, as Quagila finds.40 
The interest rate derivative markets can be considered as an example of such harmonisation 
with stability implications. Here, an initial additional benefit of the merger will lie in the ex-
38	 ECB	(2009).	OTC	derivatives	and	post-trading	infrastructures.	Report,	September	2009.
39	 ECB/	CESR	(2009).	Recommendations	for	Securities	Settlement	Systems	and	Recommendations	for	Central	
Counterparties	in	the	European	Union.	
40	 Lucia	Quaglia	(2010).Governing	Financial	Services	in	the	European	Union:	Banking,	Securities,	and	Post-Trad-
ing.
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pected provision of an integrated benchmark yield curve along the short and long end for de-
rivatives, which could facilitate price discovery processes. This will create similar market struc-
tures as in the US market, which has already obtained this advantage from the integrated CME 
Group offering. 
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Third, in a somewhat more indirect way the merger provides the market-side prerequisite for 
creating a converging level of regulation. This can be built on by regulators in efforts to cre-
ate a regulatory benchmark that discourages regulatory arbitrage between Europe and the 
united States. The existence of a transatlantic rift through regulatory divergence has been 
noted by many observers as the largest obstacle to financial stability and the further reduction 
of systemic risk, and has been a continuing challenge up to the present since the creation of 
IOSCO (the International Organization of Securities Commissions) as a rule-making body in the 
1980s.41 Even today, after the crisis, this challenge remains formidable despite the upcoming 
further regulation of OTC derivatives trading and an ongoing development of a new transat-
lantic framework for CCP risk management by means of the relevant European and US regula-
tory efforts. In this respect, the IMF, the institution charged with financial stability globally, 
warns countries to ‘discourage regulatory arbitrage’ as it warns of ‘(…) the possibility that CCPs 
could compete with each other by lowering collateral thresholds and clearing fees and adjust-
ing the layers of protection in ways that expose CMs and their customers to greater risks.’42 The 
root cause of this destabilising ‘race to the bottom’ has been competition between national 
industry competitiveness considerations and an interest in promoting international financial 
41	 David	Singer	(2007).	Regulating	Capital:	Setting	Standards	for	the	International	Financial	System.	Cornell	
University	Press.
42	 See	IMF	(2010).	Global	Financial	Stability	Report:	Meeting	new	Challenges	to	Stability	and	Building	a	Safer	
System.	Chapter	3,	p.26.
Exchange-traded IR derivatives market along the yield curve
SOURCE: Author based on BIS, FESE, WFE data
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stability, resulting in a trade-off. U.S. Treasury Secretary and former regulator as President of 
the New York Fed Timothy Geithner recently remarked on the danger of another ‘race to the 
bottom’ in relation to the marginalization of OTC derivatives markets, which he finds to have 
taken place in the run-up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.43 To the extent that the new merged 
entity no longer has an interest in lower standards on either side of the Atlantic to attract 
higher volumes, it provides a provide a market-side prerequisite for efforts to create a regula-
tory benchmark for convergence and harmonization between the U.S. and Europe. Outside 
competition will remain and outside financial centres and regulators might not yet converge to 
this benchmark. Still, this effect should not be underestimated, given how crucial and powerful 
national competitiveness considerations have previously been in preventing such regulatory 
cooperation for more financial stability, as the statements by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
have shown. 
43	 New	York	Times	(2011).	Geithner	Warns	Against	Race	to	the	Bottom.	June	6th,	2011.	
28 4 Financial Integration, Efficiency, and Harmonisation
4  Financial Integration, Cost Efficiency 
and Harmonisation44
4.1 Baseline: Integration and Fragmentation of  
European Markets
The following sections will review the status of the European trading and post-trading market 
in light of the interdependent policy objectives of financial integration, cost efficiency and har-
monisation. It will also discuss the impact of the policy efforts, most importantly the imple-
mentation of MiFID in recent years, to establish the baseline against which the merger impact 
needs to be assessed. It reveals that efforts towards these policy objectives have indeed been 
successful in creating a more cost-efficient and competitive market environment. However, 
one side effect is that the market is more fragmented domestically and remains fragmented 
in the cross-border trading area. As such, fragmentation has two components: it exists in 
terms of order flows and reduced sizes of average transactions, which has resulted from the 
MiFID introduction, and it exists along national market lines, as cross-border markets are still 
not as integrated.45 Regarding the latter point, consolidation has been necessary for years and 
is now urgently required to deliver the desired integration benefits and address the current 
fragmentation of equities and fixed income markets.
The integration, efficiency and harmonisation of the European financial markets have always 
been among the chief goals of the EU and the Eurosystem institutions.46 These overarching 
policy objectives have underlain most (de-)regulatory efforts of the European Commission in 
this market since the introduction of the euro. The macroeconomic motivation for these in-
tegration and efficiency efforts was to increase the contribution by financial services to GDP 
growth by 1.1% p.a. by merging the nationally fragmented liquidity pools into an integrated 
liquidity pool that could reduce the cost of finance across Europe and stimulate demand and 
investment.47 In 2001, the Committee of Wise Men, led by Chairman Lamfalussy, also stressed 
44	 Disclaimer:	The	analysis	here	is	not	meant	to	pre-empt	or	second-guess	the	competition	analysis	that	is	on-
going	at	the	time	of	preparation	of	this	report.	As	such,	competition	is	merely	touched	upon	in	terms	of	the	
development	of	the	industry	at	large	as	integration	and	harmonisation	have	proceeded	–	and	not	in	terms	
of	projections	of	the	merger’s	impact	on	trading	costs	or	similar	factors	(as	a	micro-economic	competition	
study	would	do).
45	 Gomber	and	Pierron	(2010).	MiFiD	–	Spirit	and	Reality	of	a	European	Financial	Markets	Directive.
46	 For	an	analysis	and	definition	of	the	integration	of	European	securities	markets,	see	ECB	Occasional	Paper:	
Heiko	Schmiedel	and	Andreas	Schönenberger	(2005).	Integration	of	securities	market	infrastructures	in	the	
euro	area.	
47	 London	Economics	(2002).	Final	Report	to	the	European	Commission:	Quantification	of	the	Macro-Economic	
Impact	of	Integration	of	EU	Financial	Markets.	
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the importance of integration, efficiency and harmonisation of trading, clearing and settle-
ment for the completion of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), but added, commenting 
on clearing and settlement, that ‘The process of consolidation should largely be in the hands 
of the private sector.’48 Since then, various regulatory efforts have focused on removing barri-
ers in cross-border securities clearing and settlement (First Giovannini Report), identifying re-
quired common regulatory standards and adequate regulatory/supervisory structures (Second 
Giovannini Report), creating an industry initiative developed by capital market service provid-
ers to self-regulate with respect to price transparency, interoperability and unbundling (Code 
of Conduct), and, in 2007, creating a common and harmonised regulatory regime for invest-
ment services in the 30 states of the European Economic Area through the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), which removed the ‘concentration rule’ in some countries that 
routed equities trading through the regulated incumbent exchanges and put in place the ‘best 
execution rule’, obliging the best execution for a customer. 
MiFiD has substantially transformed the trading industry by increasing competition markedly 
and creating cost efficiencies for traders, as well as reducing the market shares of incumbent 
exchanges significantly and almost across the board. Whereas incumbent exchanges used 
to have a national monopoly in their home markets, MiFID established a regulatory environ-
ment to encourage higher choice and increased competition and, importantly, to facilitate new 
market entry. Along with the 2006 ‘Code of Conduct’, which self-regulated the industry with 
respect to price transparency, interoperability and unbundling, this truly transformed the trad-
ing and post-trading industry along various dimensions, as multiple impact studies have since 
shown. The comprehensive database provided by the European Commission and Oxera study49 
helps put these cost developments into perspective. Along the value chain, the costs created by 
trading platforms amount to approximately 1% of the total costs for trading in Europe, when 
costs for global custodians, fund managers and brokers are included. Even when the pre-trade 
costs for fund managers are excluded, the share of total costs incurred by trading platforms 
amount to only 4.5%. These costs – 16 bp in total for trading and post-trading – mainly arise in 
the trading (11bp) of securities, whilst clearing and settlement (1bp) and custody (4bp) account 
for a smaller share of total costs, particularly when compared to the 75bp accounted for by pre-
trade fund management.
48	 Lamfalussy	Report	by	the	Committee	of	Wise	Men	(2001).	The	Regulation	of	European	Securities	Markets,	p.	
16
49	 Oxera	for	the	EU	Commission	(2011).	Monitoring	prices,	costs,	and	volumes	of	trading	and	post-trading	ser-
vices.
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These cost figures already include a substantial degree of cost efficiencies achieved in the last 
years through a concerted policy effort aimed at increasing competition. These efforts have 
successfully reduced trading costs in the period 2006-2009, as analysed in detail by the Euro-
pean Commission and Oxera. Their data indicates that substantial costs reductions have been 
achieved along the entire value chain, from trading through central counterparty, down to 
clearing and settlement services. Although there is variation across countries, the overall pat-
tern is remarkably clear: European trading and post-trading has become more competitive and 
cost-efficient – particularly in those countries with high trading volumes.
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Nevertheless, cost reductions in trading and post-trading have also been and continue to be 
an important policy priority as the European market has grown in scale and become more in-
tegrated. The trading and post-trading industry is a fixed-cost business, where increased scale 
and liquidity are the key drivers for cost reductions.50 This is obvious when looking at the Oxera 
data on financial centre costs by size. Larger and more liquid financial centres offer more com-
petitive trading costs at 8bp, whilst the smallest centres have the largest trading costs. More-
over, relatively concentrated investors, whose choice of venue has been strengthened through 
MiFID, command high bargaining power over trading and post-trading venues.51 As a result of 
increased scale and regulatory changes, costs along the trading value chain have fallen in re-
cent years. Costs of equity trading, central counterparty services and clearing and settlement 
costs have fallen substantially across the various European financial centres in the period 2006-
2009. A study by London Economics (2010) for the City of London finds that European financial 
market integration has successfully added 0.8% to 0.9% of economic activity to GDP.
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However, some financial integration challenges still remain. Firstly, MiFID means that the frag-
mentation have prevented trading cost and liquidity benefits from being realised in full. Stud-
ies confirm that liquidity fragmentation has resulted in two ways:52 Firstly, liquidity is now 
dispersed across various locations, including regulated markets (RMs), multilateral trading fa-
cilities (MTFs), dark pools and OTC markets, causing a fragmented market structure. Together 
with new trading technologies, this has led average trade sizes to decline. Gresse (2010) adds 
that such fragmentation in market structure correlates negatively with market depth and 
50	 For	a	comprehensive	more	micro-economic	analysis	of	the	economics	of	cash	trading	and	post-trading	see	
Marco	Pagano	and	Jorge	Padilla	(2005).	The	Economics	of	Cash	Trading:	An	Overview.	
51	 Ibid.	
52	 Gomber	and	Pierron	(2010).	MiFiD	–	Spirit	and	Reality	of	a	European	Financial	Markets	Directive.
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price quality, i.e. some benefits of additional scale cannot be realised.53 Thus, there are adverse 
 illiquidity and price inefficiency effects that result from a more fragmented market structure – 
a natural corollary of the pro-competition policy efforts that have also yielded the very cost 
benefits discussed above.
Secondly, another fragmentation challenge remaining is the fragmentation of European mar-
kets along national lines. This is evidenced by the fact that cross-border costs of trading have 
not yet exhibited the same decline as domestic trading costs due to the attendant lack of 
pan-European scale of exchanges. The most recent data in the study by Oxera and the Eu-
ropean Commission show that cross-border trading costs from the investor’s perspective in 
2006 were 46% higher for institutional investors and 23% higher for retail investors relative 
to domestic trading costs. In 2009 these costs were still 37% higher for institutional investors 
and 34% higher for retail investors. Of course there are many drivers of these relative cost dif-
ferences along the value chain, including taxes, scale, variation of costs across financial centres, 
and not least the way that cost savings are forwarded to investors by brokers. Nevertheless, 
the residual difference due to differences in trading and post-trading costs constitutes another 
indication of a lack of pan-European consolidation. In the derivatives market, the challenges of 
fragmentation that arise from the high volumes of derivatives that are traded over-the-counter 
mainly materialize in terms of intransparency, instability, and price discovery inefficiencies and 
have, hence, been discussed already in the stability context (see Section 3).
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53	 Gresse	(2010).	Multi-Market	Trading	and	Market	Quality.	
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What is true for the European cross-border market is all the more valid for the integration of 
the transatlantic financial market. As noted in a Deutsche Bank Research paper, the integra-
tion of what are still the two largest trading markets promises substantial welfare benefits, 
but has been lagging. As such, the combined values of capital flows and trading are ‘primar-
ily synthetic figures, which do not reflect the extent to which financial markets on the two 
sides of the Atlantic are effectively interwoven, how easily capital can flow between them, and 
whether bilateral financial transactions can be executed efficiently in the light of the integra-
tion of markets and infrastructure.’54
In summary, the major challenge ahead remains the double fragmentation of the European and 
the incomplete integration of the European and transatlantic cross-border trading and post-
trading market. The root cause of this situation is that consolidation of the exchange industry 
has begun but has not yet been completed. Thus, the market has yet to catch up so that it 
can leverage in full the potential benefits of integration that policy-makers have enabled and 
realised for the domestic trading business in particular. However, exchanges have incentives 
to drive consolidation in their pursuit of ‘economies of scale and scope and network externali-
ties’, as Schmiedel and Schönenberger note, accelerating what they call ‘the need for more in-
tegrated and efficient infrastructure, comprising exchanges, trading platforms and electronic 
networks, and clearing and settlement facilities at both the global and the domestic level.’55 
The next section analyses the extent to which the merger can contribute to this necessary con-
solidation and integrated infrastructure, and how this is likely to affect the integration, cost-
efficiency and harmonisation of the European securities market. 
4.2 Impact of the Merger: Consolidating European Markets
The merger provides an opportunity to consolidate the European market through the creation 
of a large pan-European player with enhanced depth and liquidity in trading and scale in 
clearing and settlement. The consolidation of the global trading market has proceeded in dif-
ferent waves, and has now regained momentum. This is the case not only in trading, but also 
in the European clearing and settlement industry, which is now seeing merger activity (e.g., 
LSE bid to take over LCH Clearnet), as ‘unlike the US counterpart, the European clearing and 
settlement industry is fragmented and, from an IT infrastructure perspective, unconnected.’56 
Since the main contribution of the merger towards financial integration, efficiency and har-
monisation will lie in consolidating the landscape, a short economic definition of the termi-
nology is in order. In a very comprehensive ECB Occasional Paper on this very topic, Schmiedel 
and Schönenberger define consolidation as ‘the process of concentration in the trading, clear-
54	 Steffen	Kern,	Deutsche	Bank	Research	(2008).	EU-US	financial	market	integration	–	a	work	in	progress.	EU	
Monitor	96.	Financial	Market	Special.
55	 Heiko	Schmiedel	and	Andreas	Schönenberger	(2005).	Integration	of	securities	market	infrastructures	in	the	
euro	area,	p.8
56	 Price	Waterhouse	Coopers	(2011).	Trading	blocs	What	next	for	the	stock	exchanges?.
34 4 Financial Integration, Efficiency, and Harmonisation
ing and settlement industry. It concerns not only structural aspects such as mergers and ac-
quisitions, but also outsourcing, alliances, joint ventures and reorganisations within financial 
institutions.’57 The relevance of mergers for the integration of securities markets thus stems 
from its consolidation effect, which ‘not only facilitates integration, but may also help to re-
duce the cost of trading, clearing and settlement, by making use of scale economies and net-
work externalities’, as the authors find.58 Thus, as the historically very national and fragmented 
markets are now being integrated horizontally, cross-border mergers such as the DBG-NYSE 
Euronext merger – which were overdue because the financial crisis delayed this consolidation 
effort – are the key drivers. 
The consolidation effect will be analysed in the following in terms of its horizontal, i.e. the 
merging of trading platforms and trading volumes, and vertical dimensions, i.e. the effects on 
related post-trading business in clearing and settlement. Lastly, this largely European perspec-
tive will also be complemented by a view of the merger in the context of the lagging integra-
tion of the transatlantic financial markets.
Horizontal consolidation in trading will mainly impact markets through the enhanced scale 
and liquidity realised by the new entity across various asset classes. In both equity and deriva-
tives trading, this will create the deepest European trading platform in terms of turnover, as 
measured against 2010. In bond markets, it will create an additional deep platform, although 
it will lag behind the London Exchange and the BME Spanish Exchanges in third place in terms 
of volume. Investors will have an opportunity to benefit from these larger trading volumes in 
domestic but – importantly – also in cross-border trading, which historically has led to tangible 
cost reductions for traders as well. Thus, given the historically very positive effect of consoli-
dation and integration, as outlined above, there is no reason to expect that this merger will 
trigger any detrimental effects. The cross-border nature of this transaction and the enhanced 
ability of the merged entity to attract more global trading and post-trading volumes could 
extend these cost reduction benefits to the increasingly important segment of cross-border 
trading and post-trading transactions. 
57	 Heiko	Schmiedel	and	Andreas	Schönenberger	(2005).	Integration	of	securities	market	infrastructures	in	the	
euro	area,	p.	7
58	 Ibid,	p.7
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A highly specific and somewhat indirect consolidation effect relates to what could be termed 
the creation of a benchmark yield curve in interest rate derivatives. By integrating the Eu-
ropean derivatives trading volumes, the new merger will moreover become the major player 
for futures and options in Europe and a major player globally. The very complementary busi-
nesses in the interest rate derivatives segments, with Deutsche Börse’s Eurex active mainly in 
the long end, and NYSE Liffe mainly in the short end, could result in an integrated yield curve 
benchmark for European markets. The importance of benchmarks for price discovery and effi-
ciency in securities markets has been analysed by the Bank for International Settlement’s Philip 
Woolridge.59 He spells out an important criterion for benchmark yield curves, namely that ‘the 
term structure should at any given time represent the market’s current expectations of future 
short-term interest rates. In other words, no factors other than expected future spot rates 
should systematically affect forward interest rates.’60 As such, the consolidation of interest rate 
derivatives allows for comparable levels of liquidity and depth, which would ensure that no 
factors (e.g. differing liquidity) other than fundamentals would affect the values of these listed 
exchange-traded interest rate derivatives, thus facilitating price discovery. 
Consolidation through the merger of DBG and NYX also has a vertical dimension, as Deutsche 
Börse has developed and maintained an integrated model that integrates trading with the 
clearing and settlement functions. However, this particular merger will probably have less of 
an impact in this area, since NYSE Euronext does not operate cash trading clearing services in 
cash equity clearing. However, this issue is still being debated contentiously, as the integrated 
59	 Philip	Wooldridge	(2001).	The	emergence	of	new	benchmark	yield	curves.	BIS	Quarterly	Review.
60	 Ibid,	p.49
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model has two effects, as noted by Pagano and Padilla61: It can create additional barriers to en-
try, as it takes a high level of investment, significant scale and network economies to compete 
with existing integrated models. On the other hand, there are significant efficiencies that result 
from these integrated models, as these same effects create natural cost efficiencies through 
additional volumes, which can then be passed on to end users as well reducing transaction 
costs significantly. Moreover, and this seems to be the particular benefit of consolidation in 
the clearing and settlement business, cross-margining opportunities will enable substantial 
capital savings. Cross-margining offers the opportunity to reduce margin requirements for re-
lated securities classes due to the recognition of reduced risks that come from offsetting open 
positions, which were previously cleared at different locations by different clearing houses. 
This clearly helps to economise on the collateral and capital employed and will likely be a major 
consolidation benefit in the post-trading market.
Thus, other derivatives clearing houses have adopted a strategy of vertical integration to re-
alise these benefits , including CME Group, NASDAQ OMX, ICE, ASX/SFE and the Hong Kong 
Exchange, to mention only a few. Given these efficiencies, there seems to be a strong case for 
consolidation in this market as well. The particular gains will, of course, have to be weighed 
against competition concerns by the relevant authorities and are not subject of this section. 
Beyond the consolidation and integration of the European market, the merger might provide 
some new momentum towards the very lagging integration and harmonization of the trans-
atlantic financial market. As EU-US transaction volumes have been increasing in the last years, 
convergence in market structure and integration through more seamless trading using inte-
grated platforms would be beneficial. The integration of these financial markets has been es-
timated to potentially lower transaction costs by up to 60%, to increase securities trading by 
50% and to cut equity costs for linked companies by 9%.62 Deutsche Bank Research builds on 
these efficiency gain assumptions and calculates that, based on the 2008 trading figures, these 
benefits would amount to approximately USD 48 billion in cost savings, which could mobilise 
additional trading volumes of as much as USD 10 trillion per year, measured against a total 
volume of USD 21 trillion in 2008.63 However, achieving these benefits demands the removal 
of the obstacles deriving from differences in regulation and infrastructures, which still inhibit 
the full integration of the two largest trading markets globally. In this respect, the merger can 
only make be considered a first market-side development that regulators could build on. None-
theless a transatlantic platform would be required if policymakers want to advance the har-
monisation and convergence through more seamless IT platforms, standardisation of products 
and integrated offerings. In that sense this platform is a pre-requisite for eventual regulatory 
convergence – even though this will remain a distant objective in the political arena. Of course, 
the merger will not realise these effects in full by itself, but it is clear that any move towards 
61	 Marco	Pagano	and	Jorge	Padilla	(2005).	The	Economics	of	Cash	Trading:	An	Overview.	
62	 Benn	Steil	(2002).	Building	a	transatlantic	securities	market.	Council	on	Foreign	Relations.	
63	 Steffen	Kern,	Deutsche	Bank	Research	(2008).	EU-US	financial	market	integration	–	a	work	in	progress.	EU	
Monitor	96.	Financial	Market	Special.
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transatlantic harmonisation to capture these enormous welfare gains will require the integra-
tion efforts of key market makers such as Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext. 
There could be similar consolidation benefits for issuers using the new entity. Given the addi-
tional reach, the new entity might leverage the additional capital raising opportunities through 
more global access. This benefit will accrue to both sides, but of course NYSE Euronext is al-
ready the market leader in terms of global listings, which implies that the effect appears to 
be more significant for Deutsche Börse’s European listed companies. Moreover, this ability to 
utilise access to global capital markets comes at a time when cross-listings have decreased for 
years, as it has been shown that cross-listings have limited value in terms of liquidity enhance-
ment.64 The experience of the NYSE-Euronext merger shows that the opportunity to cross-list 
in Europe has only been taken up by 10 US companies to date.65 The differences in the legal 
framework make listing across countries a relatively costly undertaking. Thus, the ability to 
gain access to global exchange markets through a globally present brand without having to 
register under the rules of another country, and without having to comply with different re-
porting standards, is expected to be the particular benefit in this case, rather than the oppor-
tunity to actually cross-list. 
64	 Richard	Dobbs	and	Marc	H.	Goedhart	(2008).	Why	cross-listing	shares	doesn’t	create	value.	McKinsey	on	
Finance	No.	29,	Autumn	2008.
65	 Neil	Stewart	(2011).	Exchange	mergers:	good,	bad	or	neutral?.	Inside	Investor	Relations	Article	dated	18	Feb-
ruary	2011.	Article	online	12	July	2011.
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5 Financial Centre Competitiveness
5.1 Baseline: The Rise and Fall of Global Financial Centres 
In the context of policy decisions related to merger, exchanges have often been seen as sym-
bols of national financial centres, their competitive standing and even their sovereign na-
tional economic interest.66 Policymakers have voiced various concerns in relation to the DBG 
NYX Euronext merger in the context of financial centre competitiveness. These concerns are 
predicated upon three assumptions, which this study wants to address: Firstly, one needs to 
assume that exchanges matter for their respective financial centre location. Secondly, there 
is the (implicit) assumption that the financial centres in Europe affected by this merger are 
currently in a position of strength and on a trajectory of growth, and thus have to fend off 
foreign influences (e.g., through merging exchanges) that could endanger that. Thirdly, it is as-
sumed that the creation of a consolidated, more internationally oriented merged entity will 
have purely negative effects (mainly in terms of employment) on national financial centres, 
which result from the realization of synergies between the merging entities with benefits 
accruing to shareholders. Regarding the first assumption, this study takes the approach that 
while this link is indirect, since employment and value added of exchanges are only a fraction 
of total financial centre value added, some intangible benefits deriving from exchange brand 
and proximity and agglomeration benefits do exist. However, certainly the second assumption 
is unsustainable while the third assumption is least incomplete in the face of the facts. The 
evidence will be presented in the following.
Financial centres contribute to the economies in which they are embedded in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, they directly add value as they create high-paying jobs, generate taxes, and ensure 
employment in related financial and professional services. Secondly, and arguably more im-
portantly, they create financial functions and markets that indirectly add value: These markets 
created in financial centres channel investments, provide funding to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, provide risk management and help to smoothen consumption throughout volatile 
times67, and contribute to financial stability at large.68 Since exchanges create and facilitate 
these market activities through the provision of trading platforms and related services, they 
are at the heart of every leading financial centre. Beyond that market-making role, the direct 
66	 The	national	interest	argument	was	for	instance	cited	as	decisive	by	Australian	authorities	in	their	rejection	
of	the	Singaporian	bid	for	the	Australian	exchange	but	has	also	been	a	key	element	of	the	debate	on	the	
merger	of	NYSE	and	Euronext.
67	 On	the	role	of	markets	(vs.	intermediaries)	in	smoothing	out	consumption	over	time	see	Franklin	Allen	and	
Douglas	Gale	(2001).	Comparing	Financial	Systems.	MIT	Press.
68	 For	an	extensive	discussion	of	this	wider	significance	of	financial	centres	to	the	European	economy,	see	a	re-
cently	published	study	on	this	topic:	Europe	Economics	(2011).	The	Value	of	Europe’s	International	Financial	
Centres	to	the	EU	Economy.	
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impact of exchanges on financial centres is somewhat limited, but there is an indirect link 
that can be analyzed. All conceptualisations of the contribution of exchanges to the respec-
tive financial centres’ competitiveness point to their indirect role in the attraction of impor-
tant agglomeration factors. Faulconbridge et al. (2007) look at the role of geographic factors 
around exchanges that boost competitiveness of financial centres and identify product com-
plementarities, the nature of local epistemic knowledge communities, and regulation as im-
portant linkages that, despite the virtualization of trading, still matter.69 Comprehensive com-
petitiveness studies conducted by the City of London70 and the City of New York71, respectively, 
concur that the agglomeration of  talent, smart regulation, the presence of good customers 
and a competitive banking  system, as well as the overall context all matter in defining com-
petitiveness. Exchanges make a small direct contribution through their own employment and 
value added but a larger indirect contribution to the financial centre context as their presence 
in terms of defining branding, attracting regulators to locate in proximity, and agglomerating 
related financial services and customers. In this sense, the presence of a leading exchange 
contributes to these dimensions in defining the respective competitive profiles of European 
financial centres.
As financial globalisation and the attendant intensifying competition among financial centres 
have brought about the consolidation of European exchanges (see above), the impact of the 
exchange merger on the competitiveness of European financial centres has become a natural 
key concern for national and European policy-makers alike. Interestingly, media reports have 
highlighted a paradox in the debate: Whilst representatives of London’s financial centres have 
expressed worries about the decline of London as a financial centre due to a rebalancing in 
favour of Frankfurt, similar concerns about a potential decline of Frankfurt as a financial centre 
in the new merged entity have been voiced on the German side.72 What is evident from these 
contradictory concerns is that there is a clear need for a fact-based assessment of the relative 
competitive positioning of the European financial centres, given the trends in global competi-
tion as well as the specific impact of the merger on European financial centre competitiveness. 
This section examines these issues.
As shown below, the globalisation of the financial centre landscape and the rise of Asian fi-
nancial centres have triggered the relative decline of Western financial centres, in particular 
of continental European financial centres such as Frankfurt and Paris. To avoid being relegated 
to the status of regional and specialised financial centres, these centres will require access to 
liquid and deep global exchanges. In this context, the DBG-NYX merger can be seen as an op-
69	 Faulconbridge	et	al	(2007).	Analysing	the	Changing	Landscape	of	European	Financial	Centres:	The	Role	of	
Financial	Products	and	the	Case	of	Amsterdam.
70	 City	of	London	(2008).	Winning	in	a	Changing	World:	Review	of	the	competitiveness	of	London’s	financial	
centre.	
71	 City	of	New	York	(2007).	Sustaining	New	York’s	and	the	US’	Global	Financial	Services	Leadership.	
72	 James	Quinn	in	the	Telegraph	(2011).	Stock	exchange	mergers:	the	fight	for	global	dominance.		
13	February	2011.
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portunity to advance the competitiveness of the affected European financial centres because 
it will contribute to talent attraction, internationalisation and the sustained presence of a com-
petitive and stable banking system.
The globalisation of capital markets has redefined competitiveness for financial centres in 
more international terms. As such, the Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI)73 produced by the 
Z/Yen Group defines financial centre competitiveness in terms of 
 ● Connectivity: ‘The extent to which a centre is well known around the world and how 
much non-resident professionals believe it is connected to other financial centres.’
 ● Diversity: ‘The breadth of industry sectors that flourish in a financial centre.’
 ● Specialty: ‘The depth within a financial centre of the following industry sectors: as-
set management, investment banking, insurance, professional services and wealth 
management.’74
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A modern, internationally competitive exchange is a contributing factor (by no means the only 
one though) towards a financial centre’s competitiveness along these three dimensions. By 
enabling access to deep and liquid global securities markets, it increases connectivity and gives 
diverse and specialised industry sectors access to innovative capital market services. The posi-
tion of the leading global financial centres that distinguishes them from leading transnational 
73	 The	GFCI	is	compiled	semi-annually	on	the	basis	of	two	thousand	interviews	with	financial	practitioners.
74	 Global	Financial	Competitiveness	Index	9	(2011),	p.	8.
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or regional financial centres can thus be defined in terms of their depth and breadth of access 
and trading in the key asset classes, as shown by the Figure above.
The globalisation of finance and the integration of emerging market financial centres with the 
global capital markets have released competitive forces that are redefining this global position-
ing game at an unparalleled speed. As a result, former national and regional exchanges and 
related financial centres are challenging the leading financial centres’ positions through vari-
ous expansion strategies and concerted policy efforts, including large-scale exchange mergers 
and partnerships. A clear catch-up race has become evident in the last 5 years, and this ap-
pears to have accelerated because of the financial crisis. When the pre-crisis ranking of finan-
cial centres in 2007 is compared with absolute improvements in competitiveness, a clear pattern 
emerges: The lower (higher) the financial centre was ranked in 2007, the more (less) it has been 
able to improve its competitiveness since then. This clear and significant catch-up pattern is 
certainly a well-known phenomenon in other spheres of economic development. It shows that 
the most relevant drivers of competitiveness from the viewpoint of market-participants seem 
to have improved relatively in those countries. The leading drivers are the stability and clarity 
of regulation, the quality of staff, taxation, IT infrastructure, costs, and market access. It also 
shows that globalisation of financial centres is a real phenomenon that has started challenging 
the established centres of the Western world, and of Europe in particular, in the past few years. 
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Whereas London and New York continue to lead the global rankings with their highly com-
petitive offerings in asset management, banking and related professional services, large Asian 
metropolises such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo that have managed to narrow the com-
petitiveness gap significantly in recent years have become closer contenders. More remarkably 
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though, the shift towards established and emerging Asian market financial centres is evident 
from the rise of Tokyo and Shanghai from ranks 10 and 30 to joint 5th place. 
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The recent trend has been for established European financial centres, particularly in the last 
4 years,  to have been in relative decline from positions of strength. They have lost ground to 
the international competition, as Europe has not yet sufficiently consolidated its fragmented 
and specialised offerings to create a genuine pan-European exchange. In plain terms, the Asian 
financial centres’ gain has been the continental European financial centres’ pain. In 2007, Frank-
furt and Paris still occupied ranks 6 and 11 in the GFCI index. In 2011, Frankfurt and Paris have 
surrendered these positions, dropping to ranks 14 and 20 respectively. Moreover, they are now 
followed closely by the upcoming exchanges in Shenzhen, Seoul, and Beijing, in ranks 15-17, 
which are catching up quickly and set for further growth as their breadth and depth rises with 
further expansion and consolidation efforts. These trends are bound to continue, as inter-
national executives name only two European cities amongst the financial centres that they 
expect to continue becoming more significant (Dublin and Amsterdam). This can also be ex-
pected to have real effects on employment growth, since it is largely these very centres where 
executives expect new offices to be opened – only London makes it into 10th place as the sole 
European city in this list (see Figure 21).
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Against this backdrop of financial centre competition, the presence of broad, liquid exchanges 
with a global reach has become a crucial asset for financial centres. To remain competitive 
in the face of increased international and domestic competition, large cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions involving exchanges have driven the consolidation of the global exchange 
landscape in recent years. The result of this exchange consolidation game can be expected 
to significantly shape the outcome of financial centre competition. An August 2011 study 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers fittingly states that ‘consolidation among Western exchanges 
may be moving to the end game, with the focus of future activity shifting towards emerging 
markets.’75 The study finds that the impact of this ‘end game’ on national financial centres will 
largely be determined by the ability of national exchanges to internationalise and diversify 
into the growing markets of the BRIC countries: ‘Many Western companies are seeking to list 
in these markets, recognising the importance of accessing their growing capital bases. In turn, 
US and European groups could face the prospect of becoming the targets for acquisition rather 
than the acquirers. However, at present the supporting infrastructure of expertise and technol-
ogy in London, New York and other leading Western financial centres still gives them a power-
ful edge in the global marketplace.’76 Market actors such as the LSE Group’s CEO Xavier Rolet 
express similar thoughts about the role of the ongoing merger activity: ‘In five years there’ll be 
three to four international exchange groups with global distribution capabilities.’77 
This global competition race between financial centres is driven by strong global structural 
trends such as the increase in cross-border capital mobility and velocity, factors that will not 
75	 Price	Waterhouse	Coopers	(2011).	Trading	blocs:	What	next	for	the	stock	exchanges?.	Report	released	August	
2011.
76	 Ibid,	p.	3
77	 Reuters	(2011).	Interview	with	Xavier	Rolet,	23	February	2011.
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diminish. Hence, consolidation will likely continue and produce a handful of leading exchanges 
that will benefit the financial centres in which these exchanges are located. When analysed 
in this global context, only two alternatives strategies for European exchanges and financial 
centres emerge as viable options in the global positioning game: 
 ● Regional niche players: To offset declining revenues in cash trading, exchanges will have 
to become more local, specialised niche players serving the needs of small-cap domestic 
companies.
 ● Global deep and broad players: Exchanges will have to position themselves for growth 
in certain global market segments as part of a more international, diversified group. 
The first option is the one that European exchanges (and their related financial centres) have 
been observing in recent years. This is where they have experienced relative decline, while 
those that have maintained their positions have largely become specialised and regional play-
ers (e.g. Dublin). How important positioning in high or low growth segments is and how it 
manifests itself in employment can be derived from an analysis of employment development 
at Deutsche Börse by segment. While Eurex, the derivatives trading segment of DBG, has been 
growing at almost 9% p.a. in recent years, employment in this segment has outpaced revenues 
with annualised growth rates of 20%. The same pattern can be seen for MD&A revenues and 
employment. This stands in stark contrast to Xetra, which has experienced negative growth 
of 8% p.a., leading to stagnating – and recently slightly declining – employment figures.78 The 
following analysis will look at the second option’s impact on financial centre competitiveness, 
something that this merger can facilitate through its contribution to enhancing the reach and 
depth of trading markets.
5.2  Impact of the Merger: Positioning Europe for Global 
Competitiveness
The direct and indirect impact of the merger on the competitiveness of the European financial 
centres affected can be captured in terms of the way that i) the relevant exchanges them-
selves, ii) investors and companies, as well as iii) the surrounding economy are  affected. Such 
a comprehensive analysis is necessarily selective and the following overview will thus focus on 
the respective key dimensions of any impact from the perspective of financial  centre competi-
tiveness.
In terms of financial centre competitiveness, the affected exchanges will mainly be impacted 
in their positioning vis-à-vis the global competition. As Europe’s relatively fragmented market 
landscape consolidates around an increasingly European market, the various financial centres 
and exchanges are being driven to develop their respective global positioning and brands, 
78	 Author	analysis	based	on	revenue	and	employment	data	from	respective	annual	reports	from	2006	–	2010.
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usually centred around certain asset classes and services, which in turn shape the percep-
tion of the financial centre as well. Economic rationale, strategic industrial policy and a cer-
tain degree of path dependence of the financial system have shaped the current structure of 
the exchange market and the positioning of financial centres over decades.79 Whilst London is 
mainly known as an OTC derivatives hub, Frankfurt has taken the lead in regulated derivatives 
trading and post-trading. Paris is regarded as a leading venue in trading, Amsterdam in pension 
management, and Luxembourg has kept is strong position in asset management capabilities.80 
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The two merger parties’ strong brands in trading and post-trading are associated with these 
comparative advantages: For European markets those are Euronext for equities and NYSE Liffe 
for derivatives trading; Xetra for equities and Eurex for derivatives trading; as well as Clear-
stream for settlement and custody; plus numerous other brands for energy trading, fixed-in-
come securities and settlement, administration and custody. The merger will necessarily re-
alise additional returns from the comparative advantages resulting from investments made in 
the specialised expertise, technology and brands of the respective financial centres. 
Moreover, the new entity is likely to create European leadership in certain global growth mar-
kets such as the regulated trading of derivatives and it could thus sustain a strong position 
with more global capital raising and cross-distribution opportunities in other businesses, such 
as cash trading or clearing services. The particular significance of the derivatives market for 
European financial centre attractiveness was already noted explicitly by the European Commis-
sion in its 1997 report on the impact of the euro on financial markets: ‘(…) Europe is a leading 
79	 For	a	historical	political	economy	account	of	stock	exchange	and	financial	system	development	see		Daniel	
Verdier	(2002).	Moving	Money:	Banking	and	Finance	in	the	Industrialized	World.
80	 Europe	Economics	(2011).	The	Value	of	Europe’s	International	Financial	Centres	to	the	EU	Economy.	
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centre for this type of business. The EU’s continued status as a leading centre for the world’s 
financial community relies upon the existence of a flourishing derivatives market.’81 This posi-
tioning, in particular in the global derivatives market, is all the more beneficial and important 
today from a strategic industrial policy perspective, since revenues in the largely commodi-
tised cash trading market have been declining in general, as a look at Deutsche Börse’s revenue 
streams shows: While revenues from Eurex derivatives trading grew at an average annual rate 
of 9% between 2006 and 2011, Xetra revenues from cash trading declined by 2% in the same 
period. As competition has increased markedly in the equities trading business, DBG and Eu-
ronext are still leading trading venues. However, they only command 11% and 15% respectively 
of order book equities trading volumes, whilst competitors like Chi-X or the LSE take the lead 
with a market share of 16% and 20% respectively. It is of course in the European economic 
interest to sustain this degree of competition in the equities trading market to maintain com-
petitive bid-ask spreads and transaction costs. At the same time, European financial centres 
have to position themselves in the strongly growing global derivatives market to offset likely 
losses in revenues in cash trading. Here, other global exchanges such as BM&FBOVESPA, Korea 
Exchange and CME Group have already taken the lead in the equity, equity index and interest 
rate segments, and have achieved significant market shares. The combined new group will sur-
pass these market leaders only in equity derivatives, but will at least represent a strong com-
petitor in equity index and interest rate derivatives (by outstanding amounts; see Figure 14).
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81	 European	Commission	(1997).	The	Impact	of	the	Introduction	of	the	Euro	on	Capital	Markets.	Communica-
tion	from	the	Commission.
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The positioning of these exchanges and financial centres is not a matter of chance, but rather 
the result of what could be called targeted (industrial) policy considerations. In the case of 
CME Group, for instance, the acquisition of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) created a North 
American exchange force in derivatives to be reckoned with on a global scale. The transaction 
was approved by the US Treasury despite the dominant position domestically versus other ex-
changes.82 Considering that 90% of derivatives volumes are actually traded OTC – a market for 
which both London and New York are positioned already – it becomes clear that the other Eu-
ropean financial centres will have to create a strong player in the global regulated derivatives 
market to remain competitive and position themselves for further global growth. This position 
in the derivatives market should reflect European stability attributes and aspirations: The 
combined offering of such derivatives trading, coupled with a strong integrated presence in 
clearing and settlement – and thus related risk management services – offers an opportunity 
to position Europe, and in particular Frankfurt (from which derivatives will be managed in the 
new entity) as a ‘hub for financial stability’. With the presence of the European Central Bank, 
the European Systemic Risk Board and a leading global regulated derivatives trading and 
clearing infrastructure, Frankfurt would certainly be able to realise agglomeration benefits in 
the area of talent attraction as well as training, expertise development and knowledge sharing 
– critical drivers for financial centre competitiveness, as described above.
Investors will mainly be affected by the merger through the resulting increase in liquidity. In 
an analysis of the Euronext merger impact on market liquidity, Nielsson (2009) distinguishes 
between three kinds of liquidity that a merger can enhance: 83 firstly there is market breadth, 
i.e. the larger number of investors trading in a particular company; secondly, market depth, 
meaning the larger quantity of shares available at a price marginally above and below the cur-
rent market price; and thirdly, other factors easing trading, such as lower transaction costs, im-
proved information and technological integration. This may be especially important in Europe, 
where Nielsson (2009) found transaction costs to be a multiple of those in the United States, 
and where the additional liquidity and trading volumes generated by the merger could lead 
to further benefits. Given these numerous ways in which mergers enhance liquidity and the 
empirical evidence he analyses, he concludes that there are few reasons why a merger could 
reduce liquidity. The merger can instead be expected to create significant liquidity increases as 
trading and clearing volumes in key asset classes grow (see Figure 24 below), and as harmon-
ised interfaces allow investors to leverage efficiencies themselves. 
82	 For	a	comparison	of	the	U.S.	and	European	assessment	of	mergers	by	leading	derivatives	players	see	Jeremy	
Grant	(2011).	Quick	View:	What	next	for	DB-NYSE	probe?	Financial	Times,	8	August	2011.
83	 Ulf	Nielsson	(2009).	Stock	Exchange	Merger	and	Liquidity.	Journal	of	Financial	Markets,	Volume	12,	Issue	2,	
May	2009,	pp.	229-267.	
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It is also important to spell out the costs of exchange mergers for financial centres, in particu-
lar as they relate to short-term headcount reductions resulting from the synergies obtained 
from harmonising infrastructure and personnel. Past mergers, such as the NYSE-Euronext 
merger, tried to downplay the negative employment effects (in this case on Paris). Looking at 
the numbers, however, it is evident that some employment reduction took place. This has cre-
ated a natural scepticism on the part of policy-makers, employees and unions. Between 2008 
and 2010, the headcount of the newly merged entity fell by around 20 per cent (789 out of an 
initial headcount of 3,757). Of severance payments made between 2008 and 2010, 62 per cent 
went to Europe (even if the published headcount reduction was roughly 50/50 between the US 
and Europe).84 Analysis of the experience of very comparable recent mergers such as the CME 
Group acquisition of CBOT and, subsequently, of NYMEX indicates that these mergers also re-
sulted in negative short-term effects in the order of 7-10% of headcount reductions.85 
However, this experience also shows that enhanced post-merger growth prospects do cul-
minate in substantial high-value added employment increases, making the net effect much 
more positive than the short-term perspective would suggest. For example, CME Group, with 
its strongly growing derivatives business has seen a 10% staff increase in the past year alone, 
more than offsetting the staff reductions in the previous year. A strong presence in growth 
segments such as derivatives clearly translates into revenue growth and attendant employ-
ment growth. The same pattern can be seen at Deutsche Börse (see above). Increased hiring 
is still happening in the most dynamic business areas that are likely to benefit most from the 
merger. Of the approximately EUR 400 million of cost synergies to be realised, it can be ex-
84	 Author	based	on	annual	reports	from	2007-2011.
85	 Author	based	on	annual	reports	from	2007-2011.
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pected that there will be negative employment effects for those financial centres where the 
currently declining cash trading businesses are located. However, taking into account the over-
all changing landscape of the industry, there are very strong reasons to believe that this trend 
would have materialized in any case due to the highly competitive market environment and the 
commoditisation of these market segments. The merger might accelerate this, but it can also 
be seen as a pledge to generate growth benefits through leadership in the derivatives market, 
which can be expected to trigger an overall positive employment effect in the medium term.
To sum up, the position of strength and growth that DBG and NYX can achieve through their 
merger does not evidence large costs but if anything an opportunity for European financial 
centres to reverse the global catch-up race in their favour. A new transatlantic player with a 
presence in the major current European and North American markets, as well as a developing 
global footprint, increases the weight of European financial centres in the global competition 
for traditional asset classes, and especially in global growth markets such as derivatives. This 
will lift the standing of European financial centres, which in recent years – with the exception 
of London – have been moving towards the status of regional specialised players in the global 
trading industry. Clearly, there will also be short-term costs that mainly derive from the nega-
tive short-term impact on employment that the realisation of group-level synergies will entail. 
However, the enhanced growth prospects of the merged entity are likely to offset this in the 
medium term, as experience from the comparable  Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)/Chi-
cago Board of Trade (CBOT) merger shows. 
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The aim of this study has been to outline the impact of the DBG-NYX merger on European 
markets in terms of the three key policy dimensions that policy-makers have to assess in this 
context. Mergers of this scale and significance, spanning continents, must be evaluated from 
multiple policy perspectives that go beyond intra-European market share and efficiency con-
siderations. Especially in light of the financial crisis, there are other policy areas such as finan-
cial stability and the global competitiveness of European financial centres that deserve the at-
tention of policy-makers. Thus, given the necessarily partial scope of this analysis (excluding a 
detailed competition analysis of this merger) this study’s main recommendation to policy-mak-
ers is to adopt a comprehensive perspective when assessing the likely impact of the merger, 
addressing all the elements analysed in this study and identifying the main trade-offs, so as 
to arrive at a balanced judgement in the best interests of competitive, integrated and stable 
European markets. 
The analysis presented here arrives at an overall positive assessment of the merger. In par-
ticular, it expects the merged entity to 
(i) facilitate regulatory action with a view to enhanced financial market stability; 
(ii)  to have a positive effect overall on the competitiveness of the European  exchange 
industry; 
(iii) to be a step in the direction of further financial integration in Europe. 
This contributes to the consolidation of the European trading market and thus further en-
hances the functioning of the single market and the single currency.
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Affirmation (of a trade confirmation) A procedure in a confirmation process, whereby a single 
record of the trade is created by one party evidencing the full terms of the trade and the coun-
terparty verifies and agrees to that record. Affirmation of trade confirmations is different from 
trade verification (also known as economic affirmation), which is limited to principal economic 
terms.A
Allocation (of trades) The decomposition of a block of trades by an investment manager into 
component sets of trades for individual clients of the manager.A
Bilateral Contract relationship between two market participants regarding trade, collateral 
and / or clearing agreements. Within a bilateral market organization all market participants 
have individually negotiated contract relationships with each other.C
Bond An instrument for borrowing funds on the capital market, where creditors’ claims are 
vested/ securitized.D
Broker A company acting as an intermediary between buyers and sellers of derivatives or se-
curities, effectively channelling orders to the market for execution. For this service, brokers 
charge a commission. Pure brokers only act as agents on behalf of the trading parties (see 
broker-dealer). D
Broker-dealer A broker also acting as buyer or seller to transactions and thus becoming a prin-
cipal party to a deal (often in the form of market making). In the OTC derivatives segment, 
broker-dealers usually act as counterparty to end customers. As the broker-dealer – usually a 
large universal or investment bank – also assumes principal risk, commissions are higher than 
for pure brokerage. D
Cash flow/payments settlement The actual execution of cash movement for payments due.A
Central bank money Liabilities of a central bank that take the form of banknotes or of bank 
deposits at a central bank and which can be used for settlement purposes.B
Central counterparty (CCP) An entity that interposes itself between the counterparties to the 
contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the 
seller to every buyer.B
86	 This	glossary	is	provided	for	the	convenience	of	the	reader.	The	definitions	are	not	original	work	of	the	
	author	of	this	study	but	were	taken	directly	from	standard	documentation	of	the	BIS,	the	ECB/CESR,	the	
Group	of	Thirty,	and	the	Deutsche	Börse	White	Paper	on	Derivatives.	The	respective	sources	are	referenced	
with	the	letter	at	the	end	of	the	quote,	referring	to	the	source	list	at	the	end	of	the	glossary.
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Central counterparty (CCP) link An arrangement between two CCPs that provides central 
counterparty services for trades performed between the participants of the two CCPs involved, 
without obliging those participants to become members of both CCPs.B 
Central data repository (CDR) Platform where data on traded contracts is registered and post-
trade recordkeeping on contracts is enabled. A repository provides information on, for example, 
the number and value of outstanding contracts, the size of counterparty risk or outstanding 
positions.D
Central securities depository (CSD) An entity that: 1) enables securities transactions to be pro-
cessed and settled by book entry and; 2) plays an active role in ensuring the integrity of securi-
ties issues. Securities can be held in a physical (but immobilised) or dematerialised form (i.e. so 
that they exist only as electronic records).B
Clearing/clearance The process of transmitting, reconciling, and, in some cases, confirming 
payment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly including the 
netting of instructions and the establishment of final positions for settlement. C
Clearing fund A fund composed of assets contributed by participants in a CCP, or by providers 
of guarantee arrangements, that may be used in certain circumstances to settle transactions 
of a defaulting CCP participant and/or cover losses and liquidity pressures resulting from its 
defaults. B
Clearing house A central entity (or central processing mechanism) through which financial in-
stitutions agree to exchange transfer instructions for funds or securities. In some cases, the 
clearing house may act as central counterparty for the participants and therefore assume sig-
nificant financial risks. B
Clearing margin Margin posted by a member of a clearing house. D
Clearing member A member of a clearing house. In a CCP context, a general clearing member 
clears on its own behalf, for its customers and on behalf of other market participants. Direct/
individual clearing members clear on their own behalf and on behalf of their customers. Non-
clearing members use general clearing members to access the system’s services. All trades 
must be settled through a clearing member.D
Closeout Acceleration and termination of a contract prior to its maturity.D
Close-out netting A special form of netting, which follows certain contractually agreed events 
(such as the opening of insolvency proceedings etc), whereby all existing obligations are accel-
erated so to become immediately due. B 
53 Glossary
Collateral An asset or third-party commitment that is used by the collateral provider to secure 
an obligation vis-à-vis the collateral taker. B
Collateralization The use of collateral to secure a transaction. In the derivatives market, col-
lateralization plays an important role to manage counterparty risk in the on-exchange (where 
collateral is pledged to CCPs) and OTC segments.D
Credit default swap (CDS) A derivatives contract to transfer the credit risk of underlying debt 
instruments (mostly bonds or loans). A CDS buyer receives credit protection. In the case of 
default, the buyer will be compensated by the CDS seller (the seller either has to buy the debt 
instrument at its face value or has to pay the difference between its face value and the re-
duced value in the case of default). In return for credit protection, the seller receives periodic 
payments from the CDS buyer.D
Credit risk The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full value, either when 
due or at any time thereafter. Credit risk includes replacement cost risk and principal risk. It also 
includes the risk of the failure of the settlement bank. B
Cross-border trade A trade between counterparties located in different countries.C
Cross-border settlement Settlement that takes place in a country other than the country in 
which one or both parties to the transaction are located. B 
Cross-margining agreement An agreement between two CCPs which makes it possible to limit 
the margin requirements for institutions participating in both CCPs by considering the posi-
tions and collateral of such participants as one portfolio. B
Cross-system settlement Settlement of a trade through a link between two separate payment 
systems or securities settlement systems. B
CSD link A set of technical and legal arrangements between an investor CSD and an issuer CSD 
for the cross-system transfer of securities.B 
Custody The holding and administration of securities and other financial instruments on be-
half of others. B
Custody risk The risk of loss on securities in custody as a result of the custodian’s insolvency, 
negligence, misuse of assets, fraud, poor administration or inadequate record-keeping. B
Default An event stipulated in an agreement as constituting a default. Generally, the failure to 
complete a funds or securities transfer in accordance with the terms and rules of the system. 
A failure to pay or deliver on the due date, breach of agreement and the opening of insolvency 
proceedings all constitute events of default.A
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Depository An agent with the primary role of recording the (direct or indirect) holding of secu-
rities. A depository may also act as registrar. B
Equities Securities that are shares in a listed company or listed investment company.D
Exchanges A trading platform where securities are listed and trading takes place according to 
specified rules, providing a liquid market for trading.C
Exposure Potential maximum loss. In derivatives transactions, exposure can be broken down 
into two components: a) the current gross market value of the derivative, i.e. the amount that 
a counterparty would lose if the other counterparty defaulted today, and b) an add-on for po-
tential future exposure to capture the risk of market value fluctuation.D
Forward (contract) A derivatives contract for the delivery or receipt of a specific amount of an 
underlying, at a set price, on a certain date in the future.D 
Future (or futures contract) A standardized derivatives contract for the delivery or receipt of 
a specific amount of an underlying, at a set price, on a certain date in the future. Futures are 
traded on derivatives exchanges.D
Governance Procedures through which the objectives of a legal entity are set, the means of 
achieving them are identified and the performance of the entity is measured. This refers, in 
particular, to the set of relationships between the entity’s owners, board of directors, manage-
ment, users, regulators and other stakeholders that influence these outcomes. B
Gross market value The aggregate market value of several derivatives contracts calculated by 
summing up the positive market value of one side of each contract.D
Indirect link A link between two CSDs through an intermediary, whereby the two CSDs do not 
have any direct contractual or technical arrangement. B
Infrastructure Organizational structures needed for the financial market to function, e.g. ex-
changes, central counterparties or settlement depositories.D
Initial margin Minimum percentage of the purchase price that a client is required to pay for 
with his or her own cash or acceptable securities to his/her broker before the client can trade. 
For futures contracts, the initial margin is calculated based on a formula set by a central 
counterparty.B
Interdealer-broker An intermediary facilitating transactions between different (broker-)dealers 
in the OTC segment. In recent years, the interdealer-broker segment has significantly gained 
importance in the derivatives market and is now almost as large as the exchange segment in 
terms of revenues.D
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International central securities depository (ICSD) A central securities depository (CSD) which 
was originally set up to settle Eurobonds trades and which is now also active in the settlement 
of internationally traded securities from various domestic markets, typically across currency 
areas. B
Interoperability Interoperability is achieved when the structure of systems or products allows 
them to be used in conjunction with other systems or products without imposing unnecessary 
costs on the users.A
Interoperable systems Two or more systems whose system operators have entered into an 
arrangement (including links) between themselves that involves cross-system execution of 
transfer orders. Such arrangement between two or more systems cannot be considered as a 
system itself.B
Legal execution The agreement by both parties of the written or electronic record of the full 
terms of a trade.A
Legal risk The risk of loss on account of the unexpected application of a law or regulation, or 
because a contract cannot be enforced.B 
Liquidity Ability to buy or sell a security at any point in time and in large volumes without sub-
stantially affecting its price. B 
Liquidity risk The risk resulting from an event that a counterparty does not receive liquidity as 
agreed. Liquidity risk does not imply that a counterparty or participant is insolvent, since it may 
be able to effect the required settlement at some unspecified time thereafter.B
Margin An amount for which highly liquid collateral is required in order to cover adverse mar-
ket price movements. B
Market maker A financial intermediary that offers to buy and sell securities or derivatives by 
providing quotes on a continuous basis. Thereby it is assured that parties wanting to trade 
find a counterparty and liquidity is ensured. Large universal and investment banks often act as 
market makers (see broker-dealer).D
Market risk The risk of losses (in both on and off-balance sheet positions) arising from move-
ments in market prices. D
Marking to market: The revaluation of open positions in financial instruments at current mar-
ket prices and the calculation of any gains or losses that have occurred since the last valuation.A
56 Glossary
Matching The process used for comparing the settlement details provided by the buyer and 
the seller of securities or financial instruments in order to ensure that they agree on the terms 
of the transaction.B
MiFID European Union directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID) which harmonises 
the regulatory regime for investment services and activities within the member states of the 
European Union.D
Multilateral netting Netting on a multilateral basis is arithmetically achieved by summing each 
participant’s bilateral net positions with the other participants to arrive at a multilateral net 
position. Such netting is often conducted through a central counterparty that is legally sub-
stituted as the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. The multilateral net position 
represents the bilateral net position between each participant and the central counterparty.A
Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) A public trading venue operated by an investment firm or a 
market infrastructure provider that brings together the buying and selling interests of market 
participants.D
Netting An agreed offsetting of mutual obligations by participants in a system. The process 
involves the calculation of net settlement positions and their legal reduction to a (bilateral or 
multilateral) net amount. Netting may take several legal forms. A
Novation Act of replacing a party to a contract with a new party. In the case of CCP-cleared 
derivatives, the CCP steps into the derivatives contract and acts as a buyer to all sellers, and 
vice versa. Thus, the CCP is the universal counterparty to all contracts.D
Off-book trades Trades that are not executed through an electronic order book or an exchange 
but confirmed through a system managed, directly or indirectly, by an exchange or MTF where 
both seller and buyer agree on the transaction (price and quantity). This system checks auto-
matically whether the transaction is compliant with the exchange rules. D
On-book trades Transfers of ownership by way of trades executed through the electronic order 
book of an exchange or MTF, where orders places by trading members are usually exposed to 
all market users and automatically matched according to precise rules set up by the exchange/ 
MTF and whose prices are displayed to the market. These trades may include floor trading or-
ganised by an exchange/ MTF. D
Operational risk The risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal controls, human 
error or management failures will result in unexpected losses (internal and external events). B 
Order A contractually binding request to other market participants to buy or sell a specific 
quantity of a financial instrument at a defined price. D
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Over-the-counter (OTC) A method of trading that does not involve an exchange. In over-the-
counter markets, participants trade directly with each other, typically by telephone or com-
puter links. A
Plain vanilla transactions Generally used to refer to a type of derivatives transaction with sim-
ple, common terms that can be processed electronically. Transactions that have unusual or less 
common features are often referred to as exotic, structured or bespoke. A
Price discovery (function) Process of finding the equilibrium price for assets and securities 
through the interaction of buyers and sellers within the market. Price discovery for exchange-
traded financial instruments takes place continuously as bid and ask offers are channelled and 
therefore matched at all times. D
Prime brokerage The provision by firms (eg large securities firms) of credit, clearing, securities 
lending and other services to clients (typically hedge funds). In OTC derivatives transactions, 
prime brokerage refers to an arrangement that permits a customer (typically a hedge fund) to 
use multiple dealers to execute OTC derivatives trades while clearing and settling those trades 
through a single prime broker. For each trade, the prime broker becomes the counterparty to a 
deal with the customer and the counterparty to a deal with the executing dealer. D
Reconciliation A procedure to verify that two sets of records issued by two different entities 
match. B
Registry An entity that records the ownership of securities on behalf of the issuer. B
Regulated market A public trading venue that is subject to stricter regulation and supervision 
than multilateral trading facilities, e.g. rules for trading instrument admission, trade controlling 
and reporting. D 
Risk management Identification and valuation of risks that are linked to a derivatives contract. 
The probability of events involving risk is then minimized and controlled. D
Securities settlement system (SSS) A system which permits the transfer of securities, either 
free of payment (FOP) or against payment (delivery versus payment).B
Settlement The completion of a transaction or of processing in a transfer system, such that 
participants meet their obligations through the transfer of securities and/or funds. A settle-
ment may be final or provisional. B
Settlement agent (settlement institution) The institution across whose books transfers be-
tween participants take place in order to achieve settlement within a settlement system. B
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Settlement risk The risk that settlement in a transfer system will not take place as expected, 
usually owing to a party defaulting on one or more settlement obligations. This risk comprises, 
in particular, credit risks and liquidity risks. D
Settlement system A system used to facilitate the settlement of transfers of funds, assets or 
financial instruments. B 
Spread Absolute or relative difference between the bid and ask limit of the issuer’s quote.D
Systemic risk The risk that the inability of one participant to meet its obligations in a system 
will cause other participants to be unable to meet their obligations when due, with possible 
spillover effects such as significant liquidity or credit problems that may threaten the stability 
of or confidence in the financial markets. The inability can be caused by operational or financial 
problems. B
Transfer order An order or message requesting the transfer of funds or securities from the 
debtor to the creditor. B
unwind The process of recalculating obligations in some net settlement systems where 
transfers between the accounts of participants are provisional until all of them have finally 
discharged their settlement obligations. If a participant fails to settle, some or all of the pro-
visional transfers involving that participant are deleted from the system and the settlement 
obligations of the remaining participants are re-calculated. B
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